

# FRAN Quarterly

QUARTER 2 • APRIL–JUNE 2013

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4







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QUARTER 2 • APRIL–JUNE 2013



Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations and research, each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. Risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Metaphorically, the arrow represents the cyclical nature of risk analysis processes and its orientation towards an appropriate operational response. The triangle is a symbol of ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth and exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal point where information from diverse sources converges to be processed, systematised and shared as analytical products. Thus, Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to form a reliable basis for its operational activities.



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#### **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

The FRAN Quarterly has been prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. During the course of developing this product, many colleagues at Frontex and outside contributed to it and their assistance is hereby acknowledged with gratitude.

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## List of abbreviations used

<b>AQIM</b>	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
<b>BCP</b>	border-crossing point
<b>CARA</b>	Centri di Accoglienza Richiedenti Asilo [Italian Reception Centres for Asylum Seekers]
<b>CETI</b>	Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes [Spanish Temporary Stay Centre for Immigrants]
<b>CIRCA</b>	Communication and Information Resource Centre Administrator
<b>CIREFI</b>	Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration
<b>EASO</b>	European Asylum Support Office
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>ECID</b>	Expertisecentrum Identiteitsfraude en Documenten [Dutch Identity Fraud and Documents Centre of Expertise]
<b>EDF-RAN</b>	European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
<b>EPN</b>	European Patrols Network
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EUR</b>	euro
<b>EURODAC</b>	European Dactyloscopy
<b>FARC</b>	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]
<b>FRAN</b>	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
<b>fYROM</b>	former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
<b>IBSS</b>	Integrated Border Surveillance System
<b>ICJ</b>	International Court of Justice
<b>ICONet</b>	Information and Coordination Network for Member States' Migration Management Services
<b>ID</b>	identity document
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>ISO</b>	International Organization for Standardization
<b>JO</b>	Joint Operation
<b>MS</b>	EU Member State
<b>PPP</b>	Pakistan People's Party
<b>RAU</b>	Frontex Risk Analysis Unit
<b>SAC</b>	Schengen Associated Country
<b>SIS</b>	Schengen Information System
<b>THB</b>	Trafficking in human beings
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UNODC</b>	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
<b>UNSCR</b>	United Nations Security Council Resolution
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>USD</b>	United States dollar
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization

### Note

As some Member States do not distinguish between the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo-Kinshasa) and Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) in their reporting, 'Congo' and 'Congolese' are used as collective terms for these two countries throughout this report unless otherwise indicated

# Executive summary

Overall in Q2 2013 there were 24 805 detections of illegal border-crossing along the external borders of the EU. In comparative terms, this figure represented a 7.4% increase in relation to the same quarter in 2012 and a 155% increase compared to the previous quarter. This is the **sharpest increase between two consecutive quarters** ever recorded since 2008, highlighting the rapidly evolving situation at the external border.

The strong increase was linked to two factors:

- (1) better weather conditions in the Mediterranean Sea, which triggered an increase at the sea border;
- (2) a sharp increase in detections at the land border between Serbia and Hungary.

On the Central Mediterranean route, the vast majority of migrants were from Eritrea and Somalia departing from Libya near Tripoli. Increasing detections continued to be reported in July 2013 in the Central Mediterranean, indicating a resurgence of the irregular migration flow between North Africa (mostly Libya) and Italy.

The increase on the Western Balkan route which started in Q1 2013 coincided with a change in the asylum policy of Hungary as a measure to harmonise it with EU standards. From January 2013, asylum applicants were no longer sent to closed centres but to open centres. Migrants detected crossing the border illegally applied for asylum and soon afterwards absconded to continue their travel to other Member States. The peak was reached in June and the flow decreased in July. The decrease coincided with Hungary organising a media campaign in Kosovo\* and the return of migrants from

Kosovo\*, on two charter flights to Pristina. Also in July, further amendments were introduced in the Hungarian asylum policy, in particular detailing the specific list of grounds for detention of asylum applicants in closed centres.

At the Greek border with Albania, in Q2 2013 Greece reported the first significant increase since visa liberalisation status was granted to Albanian citizens in December 2010. This increase concerned Albanian migrants moving to Greece as temporary workers.

In the Eastern Mediterranean area, detections were much lower (by nearly 70%) than in the second quarter of 2012, i.e. before the strengthening of operational activities implemented a year ago. The decrease is even more remarkable taking into account the volatile situation that prevails in the Middle East during the past 12 months, in particular in Syria.

Nevertheless, comparing the situation in Q1 and Q2 2013, detections in the Aegean Sea, i.e. the main area of detections on the Eastern Mediterranean route, increased significantly and there are reports of an increasing number of migrants stranded in Turkey and wishing to enter the EU. An example of this pressure was revealed in July 2013, subsequent to the reporting period, with the first detection on the Black Sea in Romania of two groups of Syrian migrants who had set sail from a small port near Istanbul.

In the Western Mediterranean, the overall number of detections in Q2 2013 showed a decrease compared to last year, even though diverging trends were observed at the land (Ceuta and Melilla) and sea borders. In Melilla,

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



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there were increasing attempts to cross the fence, with the Spanish and Moroccan authorities having to step up their surveillance measures. By contrast, detections at the sea were decreasing.

In terms of nationalities, **migrants from Kosovo\*** recorded the highest increase between Q1 and Q2 2013, with virtually all detections reported from the green border between Hungary and Serbia.

As in 2012, the number of **Syrians** detected for illegal border-crossing increased strongly between the first and the second quarter, totalling 2 784 in Q2 2013. This represented an increase of 123% compared to the previous quarter, though the detections were still lower than at their peak (3 923) in Q3 2012. In Q2 2013, Syrians were mostly reported from the Aegean Sea, where for the first time they outnumbered Afghans, followed distantly by detections at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey. Following the Greek operation Aspida implemented at the land border between Greece and Turkey, most detections of Syrian nationals shifted from the land border to the sea border with Turkey.

As was the case in 2012, detections of **Afghans** increased between the first and second quarters; nevertheless, their total figure in the second quarter of 2013 was lower than in any other second quarter since 2008.

In Q2 2013 there were 33 216 refusals of entry at the external border, an increase of over 19% compared to the previous quarter. The increase was due to an extremely large number of Russians of Chechen origin refused entry because of lack of visas at the train BCP on the Polish border with Belarus. Immediately after being refused entry, they applied for asylum in Poland, but then travelled to Germany where they also applied for asylum. The phenomenon started in March and reached its peak in May 2013, and mostly concerned migrants travelling in family units. This sudden flow could have been triggered by rumours spreading in Chechnya about Germany granting asylum to Russians of Chechen origin.

Regarding other cross-border crimes, cigarette smuggling remained the most often reported criminal activity in Q2 2013. It regained momentum with the end of winter and the season-related better accessibility of areas close to the green border.

As regards the impact of the Syrian conflict, in April 2013 the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator warned that around 500 persons from EU countries were already fighting on the side of the insurgents. Their potential radicalisation and training in the use of weapons and explosives could make them a substantial threat upon return to their home countries.



# 1. Introduction

FRAN Quarterly reports are prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and provide a regular overview of irregular migration at the EU external borders, based on the irregular-migration data exchanged among Member State border-control authorities within the cooperative framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) and its subsidiary, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN).

The main purpose of the FRAN Quarterlies is to provide:

1. feedback to the FRAN community in the context of information exchange;
2. a periodic update to the situational picture of irregular migration at the EU level; and
3. material for constructive discussion on reporting protocols and related trends and patterns.

This report is intended to simultaneously serve two objectives: first, to provide a clear summary of the situation at the external border of the EU, and second, to serve as an archive for future reference and comparative analyses. Consistent with standard archival techniques, some information is repeated among sections to serve as context.

Harmonising complex, multi-source migration data among Frontex and Member States is an ongoing process. Therefore some of the more detailed data and trends in this report should be interpreted with caution and, where possible, cross-referenced with information from other sources. The statistics should be understood in the context of the different levels of passenger flows passing through different border sections, the activities undertaken by Member State border-control authorities to secure different border sections, and widespread variation in reporting and data-collection practices.

FRAN members and Member State risk analysis experts and border-control authorities are considered the primary customers of these reports. In addition to the discussions taking place during FRAN meetings, Member State experts are invited and actively encouraged to examine and comment upon the data and analyses presented here. Despite all efforts of the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and Member State experts involved in data exchange and analyses, it is conceivable that minor errors will occur in these reports due to very challenging timelines, and the growing volume and complexity of data and other information exchanged within the FRAN community.



## 2. Methodology

This, the 20th issue of the FRAN Quarterly, is a comparative analysis of FRAN data collected between April and June 2013, and exchanged between 30 Member State border-control authorities within the framework of the FRAN. The report presents the results of statistical analysis of quarterly variations in eight irregular-migration indicators and one asylum indicator, aggregated at the level of the event. Bi-monthly analytical reports exchanged by Member States were also used for interpretative purposes and to provide qualitative information, as were other available sources of information, such as Frontex Joint Operations.

Precise definitions of Indicators 1 to 6, aimed at harmonising the data exchanged at EU level, were presented in the annexes of the Q1 and Q2 reports in 2009 and so are not repeated here.

During the June 2010 FRAN meeting, a proposal for a harmonised definition of the return indicator was outlined and several questions were presented in order to motivate discussion among FRAN members in view of establishing the regular collection of monthly return data by Frontex. Subsequently, an online survey of FRAN members was conducted to gather information and further motivate discussion to fine-tune the proposal for the indicator. The 11th FRAN report (Q1 2011) was the first to include analysis of Indicators 7A and 7B, and the definitions of these indicators are included in an annex to that report. Data collection commenced in January 2011.

The FRAN data-exchange has been in place since September 2007. Data are exchanged through the ICONet Internet platform, an

interest group of the European Commission's CIRCA server. Member State monthly data are based on a country template prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. The deadline for submitting data for each month is the 25th day of the subsequent month, with the exception of the end of year data, which are requested by 15 January each year. For this 20th issue of the FRAN Quarterly, the target for Member States to upload the monthly data was thus 25 July 2013. In principle, data submitted subsequent to this date will be reflected in the next FRAN Quarterly, except in cases where clarification is needed in order to proceed with comprehensive analysis.

Following the closure of the CIREFI working group in April 2010, most of its mandates and, of particular relevance, the exchange of data were transferred to the FRAN. Fortunately, most CIREFI indicators already overlapped with the monthly data exchange of FRAN members. The exception was the indicator on returns, which was added as part of the regular data exchange within the FRAN at the beginning of 2011.

In January 2012, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN) was formed as a specialist forum to oversee the exchange and analyses of detections of document fraud to illegally cross the external borders, and on all international flights.

The EDF-RAN data are checked for inconsistencies, and corrections are made to reported totals to bring them in line with reported breakdowns. Corrections are also made to any three-letter nationality codes not present in the reference ISO list of nationality codes.\*

\*\* <http://www.iso.org>

External borders refer to the borders between Member States and third countries. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries (Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) and third countries are also considered as external borders. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries and Schengen Member States are considered as internal borders. For the indicators on detections of facilitators, illegal stay and asylum, statistics are also reported for detections at the land borders between the Schengen Member States and Schengen candidates (Bulgaria, Romania) or non-Schengen Member States (the UK, Ireland), so that a total for EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries as a whole can be presented. It was not possible to make this distinction for air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate between extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connections but tend to aggregate data for all arrivals.

When data are examined at the level of third-country nationalities, a large percentage usually falls under the category 'Other (not specified)' or 'Unknown'. It is expected that the percentage reported under these categories will decrease with time as Member States improve the quality and speed of their identification, data collection and reporting practices; nationalities are often reported as 'Unknown' if an individual's nationality cannot be established before reports are submitted.

This issue of the FRAN Quarterly also includes main findings of Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations active for at least a proportion of Q2 2013. Namely, for sea borders they were JO Poseidon Sea 2013, Focal Points Sea 2013, JO EPN Hermes 2013, JO EPN Indalo 2013 and JO EPN Aeneas 2013; for land borders – JO Neptune 2013, JO Poseidon Land 2013, JO Focal Points Land 2013, JO Focal Points Land 2013 and Project Coordination Points 2013; for the air border – JO Focal Points Air 2013 and JO

Monthly data on the following indicators were exchanged among the FRAN community:

- 1A detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs
- 1B detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs
- 2 detections of suspected facilitators
- 3 detections of illegal stay
- 4 refusals of entry
- 5 asylum applications
- 6 document fraud (EDF-RAN)
- 7A return decisions for illegally staying third-country nationals
- 7B effective returns of illegally staying third-country nationals

FRAN and EDF-RAN data used in the tables and charts are as of 1 August 2013

Flexi Force 2013; and the return-related Project Attica 2013.

Both primary data sources, such as interviews with irregular migrants, and secondary data sources, such as reports of intelligence analysts, daily reports of deployed officers and analytical products (weekly and bi-weekly analytical reports for each abovementioned operation), were used to provide an exhaustive overview of the situation at the external borders of the EU. Additionally, open-source data were researched as background information for the present analysis.

### Acknowledgements

The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit would like to express its gratitude to all FRAN and EDF-RAN members and their associates in Member States' statistical, migration and document-fraud units who collect, aggregate and exchange monthly data, and to the analysts who compile the bi-monthly analytical reports, on which much of the detailed analyses presented here are based.

We are also grateful to Member State representatives who responded to requests for additional information on key topics and emerging trends.



## 3. Summary of FRAN indicators

Table 1. **Summary of FRAN indicators**

Detections or cases as reported by Member States


FRAN indicator	2012				2013		2013 Q2	
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on prev. year	prev. qtr
1A Illegal entries between BCPs	13 636	23 095	22 093	13 613	9 717	<b>24 805</b>	7.4	155
1B Clandestine entries at BCPs	103	126	167	203	130	<b>118</b>	-6.3	-9.2
2 Facilitators	2 105	1 785	1 712	2 118	1 622	<b>1 705</b>	-4.5	5.1
3 Illegal stay	88 461	84 891	86 759	84 817	77 127	<b>80 104</b>	-5.6	3.9
4 Refusals of entry	24 826	28 237	31 993	31 036	27 911	<b>33 216</b>	18	19
5 Applications for asylum	56 857	59 576	73 721	86 158	72 864	<b>85 362</b>	43	17
7A Return decisions issued	69 904	67 891	71 129	61 025	55 285	<b>53 586</b>	-21	-3.1
7B Effective returns	38 644	40 431	38 258	42 157	38 219	<b>39 741</b>	-1.7	4.0

Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

Figure 1. **Evolution of FRAN indicators**

Detections reported by Member States, thousands of persons

Line sections in lighter blue mark changes between first and second quarters



Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013



## 4. Situational picture in Q2 2013

### 4.1. Detections of illegal border-crossing

Overall in Q2 2013 there were 24 805 detections of illegal border-crossing made at the EU level. In comparative terms, this figure represented a 7.4% increase in relation to the same quarter in 2012 and a 155% increase compared to the previous quarter. This is the sharpest increase between two consecutive quarters ever recorded since 2008, highlighting the rapidly evolving situation at the external border.

The strong increase compared to the previous quarter was linked to two factors. Firstly, the better weather conditions in the Mediterranean Sea, which triggered an increase in illegal border-crossing detected at the sea border from 3 700 in Q1 to 10 223 in Q2 2013. Secondly, a sharp increase in detections of migrants detected at the land border between Serbia and Hungary. The increase was so strong at the Hungarian land border that for the first time since systematic data exchange

was introduced in 2008 a non-Mediterranean Member State ranked first in detections of illegal border-crossing.


Figure 2 shows the evolution of FRAN Indicator 1A – detections of illegal border-crossing, and the proportion of detections at the land and sea borders of the EU per quarter since the beginning of 2008. In Q2 2013, detections were distributed almost equally between the land (59%) and sea border (41%).

Considering the main year-on-year changes by Member State as presented in Figure 3, Hungary reported the largest volume of detections in Q2 2013, which was the first such event for a non-Mediterranean Member State since systematic data collection began. Nearly all detections reported by Hungary were made at its land border with Serbia.

This exceptional increase, one of the sharpest observed within the FRAN after the surge reported in the Mediterranean Sea in the wake of the Arab spring in 2011, was

Figure 2. In Q2 2013, detections recorded their sharpest increase between two consecutive quarters, with a relatively equal distribution between land and sea detections

Total quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPS, split between detections and the land and sea border



Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

due to large numbers of migrants from Kosovo\* or those undertaking secondary movements after having entered illegally in Greece. Most migrants applied for asylum after upon detection but soon absconded from the centres.

Italy also reported a strong increase from Q2 2012 to Q2 2013, mostly due to large arrivals during Q2 2013 in the islands of Lampedusa and Sicily and near the coast of Calabria. The increase continued in July 2013, subsequent to the reporting period of this report, which suggests the resurgence of the flow from North Africa (mostly Libya) to Italy.


In Bulgaria, the displacement brought about by operational activities in the Eastern Mediterranean area and, in particular, at the land border between Greece and Turkey, significantly increased detections from Q2 2012 to Q2 2013. Similarly, the impact of operational activities was also noticeable in detections reported by Greece, which strongly decreased between Q2 2012 and Q2 2013 (including detections at the land border with Albania, which, in contrast to the decrease at the land border with Turkey, actually doubled between these two quarters).

Apart from analysing the changes in terms of Member State distributions, it is also informative to consider these trends by nationality of migrants. Figure 4 illustrates the number of detections of illegal border-crossing of the top ten nationalities during the second quarters of 2012 and 2013 (size of circles) and the degree of change between these reporting periods (slopes).

In terms of nationalities, migrants from Kosovo\* recorded the highest increase between Q2 2012 and Q2 2013, with virtually all detections reported from the green border between Hungary and Serbia. At this border section, migrants from Kosovo\* represented half of all the detections.

Figure 3. **In Q2 2013, Hungary recorded the strongest increase compared to the situation a year previously**

Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q2 2012 and Q2 2013 for the top ten Member States shown by size of circles; gradient of the lines indicate the percentage change



\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.


Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013



\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Figure 4. In Q2 2013, nationals from Kosovo\* ranked first in detections of illegal border-crossing

Detections of illegal border-crossing in Q2 2012 and Q2 2013 for the top ten nationalities in Q2 2013 shown by the size of circles; gradient of the lines indicates the percentage change



Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

Although from a low base, migrants from Mali registered a very strong increase in Q2 compared with the year previously, from 110 to 635. In Q2 2013 they were mostly detected in the Pelagic Islands having departed from Libya. Using predominantly the same route, migrants from Eritrea also increased sharply from 461 to 1 948 by quarter a year on.

The number of Syrians detected for illegal border-crossing increased from 2 024 in Q2 2012 to 2 784 in Q2 2013, but detections were still lower than at their peak (3 923) in Q3 2012. In Q2 2013, Syrians were mostly reported from the Aegean Sea, where for the first time they outnumbered Afghans, followed at a distance by detections at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey. Following the Greek operation Aspida, most detections of Syrian nationals shifted from the land border to the sea border with Turkey.


Detections of Afghans crossing the border illegally decreased compared to the situation a year ago. As was the case in 2012, detections of Afghans increased between the first and second quarters; nevertheless the total in Q2 2013 was the lowest for any second quarter since 2008. As shown in Figure 5, detections of Afghans crossing the border illegally have fluctuated in the past and are likely to rise in the third quarter 2013. In fact, since 2008 detections of Afghans crossing the border illegally have always peaked in the third quarter. The volume of the increase, however, varied widely from year to year and so is difficult to predict. Indeed, the situation has been very volatile in Afghanistan for several years, and Iran, hosting a large community of Afghan refugees, has been less and less accommodating for Afghan refugees over the past several months.

There were important variations in the extent to which several nationalities were detected at specific border sections between the second quarters of 2012 and 2013. The most no-



Figure 5. **In Q2 2013, detections of Afghans crossing the border illegally were lower than ever before in the second quarter**

Detections of Afghans crossing the border illegally by quarter since the beginning of 2008; the second quarter of each year is marked with small blue circles



Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

table one was that migrants from Kosovo\* detected at the land border between Hungary and Serbia by far outnumbered detections of any other nationality at a single border section. Detections of illegal border-crossing by migrants from Kosovo\* represented nearly 20% of all detections reported at the external border in the second quarter 2013.

At the same border section, detections of illegal border-crossing of Pakistanis also rose sharply. As was the case for increased detections of migrants from Kosovo.\*

Detections of illegal border-crossing at the land border between Greece and Albania, 99% of which concerned Albanians, also rose sharply compared to the situation a year previously, and also compared to the situation in the first quarter of 2013. While the number of detections remained much lower than in 2010, when they ranged between 6 000 and 12 000 per quarter, this increase may be an indication of further increases to come in the future.

The following is a list of border sections reporting more than 1 000 detections in Q2 2013 with an indication of the most commonly reported nationalities:

1. Land border between Hungary and Serbia, where migrants from Kosovo\* represented about half of the detections, followed by a wide range of nationalities, most notably Pakistanis;
2. The Greek Aegean Sea, which in the past 12 months saw an increasing displacement of illegal border-crossings from the Greek land border with Turkey. For the first time at this border section, Syrians were reported in larger numbers than Afghans;
3. The Italian Pelagic Islands, including Lampedusa, with detections of a wide range of illegally crossing African nationals, mostly those coming from the Horn of Africa (Eritrea and Somalia);

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



4. The Greek land border with Albania with a significant trend of Albanian circular migrants;
5. The Italian island of Sicily with most detections being of Eritreans who left from Libya;
6. The Bulgarian land border with Turkey, where Syrians, as in the Aegean Sea, were the top ranking nationality;
7. The Italian sea border near Calabria, where Egyptians and Syrians were the most detected migrants. Most migrants detected crossing the border illegally in this region had sailed from Egypt or Turkey.

#### 4.2. Routes

For more detailed analyses, detections of illegal border-crossing are frequently classified into major irregular migration routes, relating to regions of detection rather than linear routes taken. As illustrated in Figure 6, during the second quarter of 2013 detections of illegal border-crossing in the Western Balkans ranked first among the main irregular migration routes. Detections in the Central Mediterranean area ranked second, as the detections on this route reported a more

pronounced increase between the first and second quarters of the year than it was the case for the Eastern Mediterranean route. The figure also shows the steady increase in detections of illegal border-crossing at the land border between Greece and Albania.


Compared to the situation a year ago, substantial increases (more than 10%) were reported in the Western Balkans, Central Mediterranean area, including an increase in Calabria, and at the land border between Greece and Albania.

##### 4.2.1. Western Balkan route

Detections of illegal border-crossing strongly increased on the Western Balkan route, from 2 776 in Q1 to 8 937 in Q2, reaching a record high since data collection began in 2008. The increase on the Western Balkan route started in Q1 2013, coinciding with a change in the asylum policy of Hungary as a measure to harmonise it with EU standards. From January 2013, asylum applicants were no longer sent to closed centres but to open centres. Migrants detected crossing the border illegally applied for asylum and soon afterwards absconded to continue their travel to other Member States. The peak was reached in June and in July the flow decreased, coinciding with Hungary or-

Figure 6. In Q2 2013, detections in the Western Balkans ranked top, while detections on the Central Mediterranean rose faster than detections in the Eastern Mediterranean


Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPS by main irregular migration route



Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

Figure 7. **The strongest increase between Q1 and Q2 was reported for nationals from Kosovo\*, who were not previously detected in large numbers**

Quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing on the Western Balkan route (mostly between Hungary and Serbia) for nationals of Kosovo\* and all other nationalities



Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

ganising a media campaign in Kosovo\* and the return of migrants from Kosovo\*, on two charter flights to Pristina. Also in July, further amendments were introduced in the Hungarian asylum policy, in particular detailing the specific list of grounds for detention of asylum applicants in closed centres.

Virtually all detections were reported from the border section between Hungary and Serbia. In fact, detections of illegal border-crossing at the neighbouring border sections of Romania-Serbia, Hungary-Croatia and Slovenia-Croatia, all decreased to almost negligible levels in Q2 2013, indicating a clear motivation of migrants for crossing illegally the land border between Hungary and Serbia.

The land border section between Hungary and Serbia is approximately 150-kilometre-long, cut by the expressway linking Belgrade in Serbia and Budapest in Hungary through the BCP of Röszke. This is one of the main transit points for traffic from the Western Balkans to Member States. Most detections of illegal border-crossing were reported from the area around BCP Röszke, as it provides the easiest opportunity for migrants to continue their journey onwards to Member States.

In previous quarters, the Western Balkan route was mostly used for secondary movements of migrants who had originally illegally entered the EU from Turkey to Greece. Detections of illegal border-crossing associated with such secondary movements indeed increased markedly in Q2 2013, with increasing detections of nationals from Pakistan and Algeria in particular.

This secondary flow across the Western Balkans includes persons who have stayed in Greece for a long period, but increasingly also those who have recently arrived on Greek Islands from Turkey and are on their way to other Member States. The growing detections of persons from the regions of North and West Africa probably also indicates an increase in the use of flight connections from their origin countries to Turkey.


The sharpest increase was reported for nationals of Kosovo\* who had not been detected in large numbers before January 2013 (see Fig. 7). From Kosovo\* migrants travel by public transport to Serbia, which they enter using Kosovo\* ID cards, and then they immediately try to reach Subotica at the border with Hungary. In Subotica, local fa-

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Figure 8. In Q2 2013, compared to the situation a year ago, detections of illegal border-crossing increased in the Western Balkans, in the Central Mediterranean (including Calabria) and at the land border between Greece and Albania

Detections of illegal border-crossing in Q2 2013 by route and percentage change in relation to Q2 2012



cilitators and taxi drivers take the migrants to the vicinity of the border and then they continue towards Hungary on foot.

Consequently, detections of Kosovo\* citizens staying illegally in other Member States recorded a marked increase in Germany and Austria. Similarly, detections of Pakistanis and Algerians, the main other nationalities detected at the border between Hungary and Serbia in Q2, were also increasingly detected staying illegally in Germany, Austria, France and Italy.

In July, further amendments were introduced in the Hungarian asylum policy, in particular detailing the specific list of grounds for detention of asylum applicants

in closed centres (see Section 4.7. Asylum claims). Information received from the Hungarian authorities and within Frontex Joint Operations active at the land border between Hungary and Serbia showed that the number of detections of illegal border-crossing fell markedly in the first few weeks of July. It is thus expected that the flow of migrants detected crossing the border illegally will further decrease in the third quarter 2013.

#### 4.2.2. Central Mediterranean route

Irregular migration in the Central Mediterranean area increased massively back in 2011, largely due to the political and civil unrest across North Africa, particularly in Tu-

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Table 2. In Q2 2013, for the second consecutive quarter, the largest number of detections were reported from the Western Balkans

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs by main irregular migration route

	2012				2013		2013 Q2		
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on prev. year	% change on prev. qtr	per cent of total
<b>Western Balkan route</b>	1 472	1 402	2 028	1 489	2 776	8 937	537	222	36
Kosovo*	186	197	271	288	567	4 439	2 153	683	50
Pakistan	122	151	389	199	388	1 496	891	286	17
Algeria	287	234	155	102	340	491	110	44	5.5
Other	877	820	1 213	900	1 481	2 511	206	70	28
<b>Central Mediterranean route</b>	<b>928</b>	<b>2 548</b>	<b>3 427</b>	<b>3 476</b>	<b>1 124</b>	<b>5 311</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>373</b>	<b>21</b>
Eritrea	39	215	411	1 224	3	1 824	748	60 700	34
Somalia	548	1 085	854	907	271	1 141	5.2	321	21
Egypt	0	408	287	135	216	411	0.7	90	7.7
Other	341	840	1 875	1 210	634	1 935	130	205	36
<b>Eastern Mediterranean route</b>	<b>8 220</b>	<b>14 125</b>	<b>11 073</b>	<b>3 806</b>	<b>2 734</b>	<b>4 532</b>	<b>-68</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>18</b>
Syria	697	1 911	3 543	971	951	2 043	6.9	115	45
Afghanistan	1 388	3 739	3 328	1 111	524	1 213	-68	131	27
Somalia	401	430	266	52	133	217	-50	63	4.8
Other	5 734	8 045	3 936	1 672	1 126	1 059	-87	-6.0	23
<b>Circular route from Albania to Greece</b>	<b>1 191</b>	<b>1 751</b>	<b>1 203</b>	<b>1 357</b>	<b>1 174</b>	<b>3 013</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>12</b>
Albania	1 166	1 729	1 196	1 307	1 117	2 985	73	167	99
Kosovo*	3	2	1	28	21	10	400	-52	0.3
Georgia	3	0	1	3	3	10	n.a.	233	0.3
Other	19	20	5	19	33	8	-60	-76	0.3
<b>Western Mediterranean route</b>	<b>967</b>	<b>1 549</b>	<b>2 002</b>	<b>1 879</b>	<b>1 175</b>	<b>1 348</b>	<b>-13</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>5.4</b>
Not specified	297	487	524	464	595	632	30	6.2	47
Algeria	170	575	859	411	226	319	-45	41	24
Mali	4	21	60	109	86	120	471	395	8.9
Other	496	466	559	895	268	277	-41	3.4	21
<b>Apulia and Calabria</b>	<b>661</b>	<b>1 137</b>	<b>1 896</b>	<b>1 078</b>	<b>502</b>	<b>1 288</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>5.2</b>
Egypt	178	112	131	3	4	353	215	8 725	27
Syria	4	64	313	91	58	339	430	484	26
Pakistan	71	270	414	401	285	292	8.1	2.5	23
Other	408	691	1 038	583	155	304	-56	96	24
<b>Eastern borders route</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>552</b>	<b>423</b>	<b>437</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>338</b>	<b>-39</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>1.4</b>
Georgia	29	130	79	90	40	81	-38	103	24
Moldova	27	56	58	30	13	42	-25	223	12
Vietnam	19	14	22	103	33	33	136	0	10
Other	110	352	264	214	134	182	-48	36	54
<b>Western African route</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>0.1</b>
Mali	0	0	0	5	4	19	n.a.	375	58
Senegal	0	0	9	6	5	5	n.a.	0	15
Guinea	0	0	0	2	1	3	n.a.	200	9.1
Other	12	31	31	78	2	6	-81	200	18
<b>Other</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>n.a.</b>	<b>n.a.</b>	<b>0</b>
Turkey	0	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	40
Guinea	0	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	40
Morocco	0	0	0	0	0	1	n.a.	n.a.	20
Other	0	0	1	0	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>13 636</b>	<b>23 095</b>	<b>22 093</b>	<b>13 613</b>	<b>9 717</b>	<b>24 805</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>100</b>

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013



nesia and Libya. Since the end of that year, irregular migration in the region has been more stable, but detections of illegal border-crossing markedly increased from 1 124 detections in Q1 2013 to 5 311 in Q2. The increase started in May, as a result of better weather conditions. According to reports subsequent to the reporting period, detections further increased in July 2013, indicating a resurgence of irregular migration flow along this route.

In the second quarter of 2013, most arrivals were recorded in Lampedusa and in Sicily. In addition, Malta reported 208 detections of illegal border-crossing.

Launched on 6 May, the JO Hermes 2013 took over the JO Hermes 2012. The operation was established to support the Italian authorities in tackling irregular maritime migration on the coasts of Sicily, Pantelleria and the Pelagic Islands (Lampedusa, Linosa, Lampione). Compared to 2012, the operational area has been enlarged to the south-east coast of Sicily.

Most migrants departed from Libya, from the coastal area near Tripoli. According to various sources, many more migrants are waiting on the Libyan coast to travel towards Italy.

Most migrants detected for illegal border-crossing on the Central Mediterranean route were from Eritrea (1 824) or Somalia (1 141), together representing 56% of all detections on this route in Q2 2013. West Africans (1 088) represented another large group of migrants, coming mostly from the Gambia and Mali.

During interviews of migrants conducted in the framework of the JO Hermes, most Eritreans and Somalis indicated that they had left their country due to security concerns rather than economic reasons. Apparently

they were threatened by regional authorities or by members of different clans. Somalis and Eritreans reported using the same route through Ethiopia and Sudan. Khartoum in Sudan was often mentioned as an important gathering point, where facilitation services can be easily found. The fare for transportation from Khartoum to Libya was mentioned to be at around USD 500, on Toyota pick-up trucks driven by armed Chadian nationals. However, once in Libya, they were requested to pay an additional fare (USD 200) for the final leg of the journey to Sabha. From there, they had to find their way to Tripoli. From Tripoli, the sea crossing to Lampedusa was reported to cost another USD 500–1 500. All together, the journey from the Horn of Africa to Tripoli lasted between one and three months, and the migrants paid between USD 2 000 and USD 4 000, depending on their negotiation skills. In most cases Italy was indicated as the destination country, although in a few cases, Scandinavian countries were also mentioned.

Compared to the journey from the Horn of Africa, the trip from West Africa to Tripoli was reported as much less costly, at about USD 1 000. One of the reasons is that migrants from West African countries often find their own way to Agadez in Niger, using available public transportation. Some claimed to have paid as little as USD 45 to get from Agadez to the Libyan border. Many reported to have taken their journey in stages, stopping over in different cities doing menial jobs to finance the next leg of their travel.

Egyptians were also reported on the Central Mediterranean route, with 411 detections in Q2 2013. In this way, Egyptians intend to avoid being returned to Egypt, as the return agreement between Egypt and Italy does not include minors. These cases show that facilitation networks are well aware of Italian immigration law and use this knowledge to

contour it as part of their *modus operandi* to smuggle migrants into the EU.

Some Syrians (163) were also detected, but during the interviews they mentioned they had left Turkey on a sailing boat with the assistance of facilitators. On their way to Italy they stopped to pick up additional migrants. In Q2 2013, a relatively large number of Pakistani migrants arrived in Lampedusa. This is rather unusual as Pakistani migrants are usually detected on the Eastern Mediterranean route. In contrast to most other migrants who mentioned to have departed from Tripoli, the Pakistani migrants reported having left Libya from Zuwarah.

#### 4.2.3. Apulia and Calabria

In Apulia and Calabria in southern Italy, detections tend to be associated with different movements of irregular migration. Most of the detections in the area of Apulia are linked to secondary movements from Greece to Italy, while most of the detections in Calabria are associated with migrants who departed from Turkey or Egypt, sailed across the Aegean Sea, often near Crete, towards Italy.

In this area, the JO EPN Aeneas 2013 started on 3 June and is scheduled to run until 30 September 2013. The Operational Plan defines two operational areas (Apulia and Calabria) covering the shore of the Ionian Sea and part of the Adriatic Sea. As in previous quarters, detections in the second quarter of the year in Apulia (288) were much lower than detections in Calabria (1 000).

With regard to detections in Apulia, reports from the JO Poseidon Sea indicated many departures from the Greek island of Corfu. As in previous years, most migrants were nationals from Asian and Middle Eastern countries who had previously entered Greece via the land and sea border. Accord-



Figure 9. **Italian coast guards help immigrants out of their boat off the coast of Lampedusa – most migrants departed from Libya and were from the Horn of Africa**

ing to migrant statements, Athens remains the main place for migrants to organise their trip, with facilitation networks offering various options according to the budget of the migrants.

Reports from JO EPN Aeneas 2013 show that the number of migrants illegally crossing the Ionian Sea from Greece to Italy was decreasing in the recent months. This decrease in secondary movements is linked to the preference of migrants to travel from Greece across the Western Balkans to their final destination in the EU.

Interestingly, some migrants were detected near Bari, in Apulia, and maintained that they had arrived after leaving Greece and making the land journey across the Western Balkans. They made this long journey to Bari following facilitators' recommendations to present themselves at the CARA Centre on the grounds that the likelihood for them to obtain asylum was higher there than elsewhere. These incidents indirectly reveal the ease for irregular migrants to travel across the Western Balkans from Greece to Italy.

Detections in Calabria were mostly associated with departures from Turkey and Egypt, and the main nationality detected there



was Syrians. Information provided by the Intelligence Officer of the JO Hermes 2013 showed that, as in 2012, the *modus operandi* involved Egyptian facilitators and Asian irregular migrants. The Egyptian facilitators using Egyptian fishing vessels departed from an Egyptian port heading to Crete. Once in Crete, the migrants were transferred to another fishing vessel to continue their journey towards Calabria in Italy. According to information provided by migrants, Alexandria continues to be the main hub for migrants wanting to reach Italy. The price requested by facilitators varies from USD 3 000 to 5 000.

Many migrants reported transshipment in high seas from large fishing boats to smaller wooden boats to reach the shores. In July 2013, for the first time, evidence of this *modus operandi* was obtained from the camera of an Icelandic airplane deployed in the context of the JO Aeneas.

The facilitation networks operating in Egypt and Italy maintain contact via satellite telephones. In one case, the facilitators onboard faced technical difficulties with one boat and were able to request another vessel to continue the trip to Italy.

The number of Egyptians detected in Apulia and Calabria reached a record level during Q2 2013. Most of the migrants were single males, indicating that so far facilitators are still targeting mostly economic migrants rather than entire family units fleeing violence. Little information could be gathered during interviews, but the migrants did not represent a particular religious community.

This increase might be a sign that established facilitation networks are taking advantage of the difficult economic and political conditions in Egypt to offer their services to an increasing number of migrants. Nevertheless, the return agreement

between Italy and Egypt continued to be in force and most detected adult Egyptians were eventually returned. However, comparing returns and detections of illegal border-crossing, the gap between detections of illegal border-crossing and return was widening in Q2 2013.

The quick and effective return of migrants who have crossed the border illegally is seen as an important measure to prevent would-be migrants in Egypt from embarking into a perilous sea crossing. If the return capacity would be saturated, for example due to a sudden and large wave of migrants, it is likely that the news will spread quickly among would-be migrants in Egypt and trigger further arrivals.

#### 4.2.4. Eastern Mediterranean route

Since 2008, the Eastern Mediterranean route has been a major hotspot of irregular migration into the EU, mostly associated with illegal border-crossings from Turkey. However, since early August 2012 detections on this route have been at much lower levels. In Q2 2013 there were 4 532 detections of illegal border-crossing on the Eastern Mediterranean route, which constitutes a decrease of 68% compared to the same period in 2012. Detections on the Eastern Mediterranean route represented 18% of the EU total in Q2 2013.

The marked decrease in detections observed since August 2012 is due to a range of operational activities taking place at different border sections on the Eastern Mediterranean route:

1. The Greek operation Aspida deployed additional manpower, assets and equipment to the Evros region in order to curb the flow of irregular border-crossing. The fourth phase of this operation was launched in April 2013. In addition to the operation Aspida, the operation Xenios






Figure 10. On 24 July 2013, a transhipment of 83 migrants (Syrians, Egyptians, Palestinians and Iraqis) in the Ionian Sea was the first documented evidence of this modus operandi; their places of departure were Alexandria (Egypt) and Latakia (Syria). The video footage (left) was recorded from an Icelandic aircraft deployed in the framework of the JO Aeneas 2013

Zeus focused on detecting migrants in land in urban areas around Athens.

2. A Specialised Police Operation at the Bulgarian-Turkish land border and enhanced air surveillance have been ongoing since 1 October 2012. Since 1 July 2012, the Bulgarian authorities have implemented an Integrated Border Surveillance System (IBSS)\* at the border section between the BCPs of Kapitan Andreevo and Lesovo, covering 58 km. Regular bilateral joint meetings for preventing and resolving border incidents take place under an agreement signed between Bulgaria and Turkey.
3. The JO Poseidon Land 2013 that was active during Q2 2013 at the land border with Turkey. Regular meetings between the Greek and Turkish authorities take place on a monthly basis with the exchange of relevant data and information.
4. The JO Poseidon Sea 2013 was also active during the reporting period in order to tackle the flow of irregular migrants penetrating the external EU sea borders in the Eastern Mediterranean mainly from Turkey and, to a lesser extent, from Egypt.

As can be seen in Figure 11, this range of operational activities led to a rapid and sustained decrease in detections. Detections at the borders with Turkey have remained lower since the activation of these operational measures. In the second quarter 2013, detections in the Aegean Sea were the largest on this route, but overall detections were much lower than a year ago.


With 2 043 detections in Q2 2013, Syrians were by far the most detected nationality on this route. More than half of these detections were in the Eastern Aegean Sea region, with significant numbers also at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey. Interviews are not routinely performed in Bulgaria, but nationality swapping was confirmed by a Frontex screening team. Nationality swapping may have artificially inflated numbers of detected Syrians at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey.

For much of the last few years migrants from Afghanistan have been detected in very high numbers on the Eastern Mediterranean route; in Q2 2013 far fewer (just 1 213) were detected although they were still the second most commonly detected nationality on this route.

\* The system consists of stationary posts with long-range 360-degree cameras triggered by movement-detection sensors. It is currently operative along a 58-kilometre stretch of the Bulgarian-Turkish border plus a short section of the Greek-Bulgarian border. It is planned to cover the whole Bulgarian-Turkish border by mid-2015.

Figure 11. **Since August 2012, detections in the Eastern Mediterranean have shown a marked decrease following enhanced operational activity in the area**

Monthly detections of irregular migration at the border with or on entry from Turkey



### Greek land border with Turkey

During the first half of 2012, the Greek land border with Turkey was the undisputed hotspot for illegal border-crossings into the Schengen area. However, since August 2012 detections at the Greek land border with Turkey have been much reduced following the launch of the Greek operation Aspida.

While detections of illegal border-crossing have much reduced, the Greek authorities also regularly reported observing migrants on the Turkish territory. The Turkish authorities themselves reported on their website the detections of several hundreds of migrants in areas close to the Greek land border. These reports are indicative of sustained pressure of irregular migration on this route.

During the reporting period, the Greek authorities reported several facilitation cases on roads close to the border, including migrants detected hiding in vehicles on the Egnatia highway which allows for rapid connection from the Turkish border to the border with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. One of these cases involved a Bulgarian facilitator in a vehicle carrying 11 migrants. Another case involved migrants hiding in a lorry that had just crossed the border. The migrants started the journey in Istanbul and left the lorry before the border. They crossed through the green border while the lorry crossed the border empty. They went back on the same lorry once in Greek territory and were detected on the Egnatia highway.

These recent cases suggest that, in contrast to the situation in early 2012 when migrants were actually waiting to be detected by the police, they now try to avoid detections when crossing the border illegally and during their journey inland. It is also reasonable to assume that with more migrants hiding, the number of undetected migrants may also be increasing, although so far no evidence to suggest that it would be in significant number.

#### **Bulgarian land border with Turkey**

Detections at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey began to increase almost immediately after the beginning of the Greek operation Aspida, but the Bulgarian authorities were quick in strengthening their surveillance.

In the second quarter, information gathered during JO Poseidon showed that migrants were increasingly detected in the area not covered by the Integrated Border Surveillance System (IBSS). Indeed, during interviews, migrants indicated that facilitators were aware

of the border areas under IBSS and advised migrants to avoid these areas.

The interviews carried out with migrants apprehended in the Bulgarian operational area lead to the conclusion that most crossed the land border with the help of local residents from the area of Edirne who were either working for the facilitation networks based in Istanbul or were just working on their own.

Migrants tended to arrive in Edirne using either public transportation or transport provided by facilitators, and then they were handed over to local smugglers with experience in facilitating the border-crossing. Many were instructed to claim false nationalities, but their fingerprints were recorded electronically and sent to the EURODAC database.

Like in neighbouring border sections (the Greek land border with Turkey and the Aegean Sea), Syrians were the most commonly detected migrants at this border section. Based on screening of migrants performed in Bulgaria, it was established that they come from different ethnic groups, including Kurds and Palestinians.

The main pull factor for migrants to cross illegally the Bulgarian land border with Turkey is the relatively cheap price (about EUR 100 to EUR 300) compared to crossing to Greece. The cheap price may also be an indication that for many migrants, Bulgaria is not an option and does not simplify their access to the Schengen area. Except Syrian families applying for asylum in Bulgaria with the intention to stay there due to cheaper living conditions than in Turkey, most other migrants prefer to enter the Schengen area through Greece and then further on to other EU Member States.



### East Aegean Sea

This border section was ranked second at the EU level in Q2 2013. For the first time, Syrians outnumbered Afghans at this border section.

The JO Poseidon Sea 2012 was operational throughout the reporting period, focussed on tackling the flow of irregular migrants penetrating the external EU sea borders in the Eastern Mediterranean mainly from Turkey and, to a lesser extent, from Egypt.

In the vast majority of cases, the migrants were given instructions on how to reach the Greek Islands. The migrants were always given a reference point on the Greek Islands (lights of a tourist complex or city, airport lights, etc.) and were advised to maintain a steady course towards the lights. Hence many vessels tended to depart during hours of darkness rather than during the day.

Based on the information gathered from interviews it is thought that a considerable number of migrants were arriving undetected on the Greek Aegean Islands. Once the migrants arrive on the islands, most of them turn themselves in to the local authorities while a smaller number of migrants try to leave the islands undetected.

Most of migrants targeted the islands of Lesbos and Samos. However, detections were reported also elsewhere in the Aegean Sea, covering a large area from Samothrace Island in the north, reporting its first detections, and Megisti Island in the south. The increase in detections in islands that were previously not considered as main targets may ultimately reduce the effectiveness of the deployed maritime assets due to the increasing length of the area to be covered.

In May, a two-week Turkish Naval exercise was carried out in the Aegean Sea.

This exercise had a direct impact in reducing the number of detections of illegal border-crossing. Soon after it ended, on 3 June, the number of arrivals of irregular migrants increased in the operational area of JO Poseidon Sea.


As in previous years, with the beginning of the tourist season on the Greek Islands, irregular migrants were trying to reach other EU destinations aboard charter flights, targeting in particular destinations such as Bergamo, Brussels and Stockholm by using false documents and mixing amongst the EU citizens returning home after their holidays.

Syrians have been the most commonly detected migrants during the JO Poseidon Sea so far in 2013. Most were men travelling alone but there were some family units, and all were heading for Sweden or Germany to claim asylum. Once they entered Turkey, those intending to enter the EU travelled to Istanbul in order to make contact with facilitation networks. They stayed in Istanbul for between 1–12 weeks before being taken by van to the west coast of Turkey to depart towards the Greek eastern Aegean Islands.

Afghans were also detected in this region. Most were previously resident in Iran. During interviews conducted during JO Poseidon Sea, many Afghans stated that they departed from Iran as a result of the measures implemented by the government aiming to decrease the number of Afghan refugees in Iran. The Afghan community in Iran can easily find networks that can smuggle them to Turkey and then to Greece. Once in Turkey, the Afghan migrants were transported by public transport to Istanbul and from there mainly by private transportation directly to departure area on the western coast of Turkey, where they boarded rubber boats destined for the Greek Eastern Aegean Islands.

Figure 12. **There has been increased detections of migrants, particularly Syrians, using fraudulent documents on flights from Turkey since the beginning of the Greek operation Aspida in August 2012**

Number of travellers detected using fraudulent documents on flights arriving in the EU or Schengen area from all Turkish airports, by quarter since January 2011



Source: EDF-RAN data as of 1 August 2013

Information gathered during the interviews conducted in the framework of the JO Poseidon Sea, revealed that a large number of irregular migrants, mainly from Syria and Afghanistan, are waiting in Istanbul and Izmir to enter the EU illegally.

Somalis ranked third on this route and of the Somali migrants interviewed during JO Poseidon Sea, the majority were males aged 20–30 years, Muslims belonging to the Hawiya, Daroud and Digli tribes. They spoke Somali, Arabic and English. They claimed Greece was their final destination.

According to information gathered during the interviews, Ankara is a hub for Somalis due to the presence of a strong diaspora in the city. In Ankara, migrants are assisted by fellow nationals that provide them with food and shelters as well as assistance in contacting facilitators for their illegal border-crossing to Greece.

### Flights from Turkey

Since the beginning of the Greek operation Aspida, there has been an increase in the number of migrants detected arriving on flights from Turkey using fraudulent documents, particularly Syrians as well as other nationalities usually associated with illegal border-crossing into Greece from Turkey including Iranians, Iraqis and Palestinians.

Figure 12 shows the number of detections of document fraudsters arriving in all EU Member States/Schengen Associated Countries during each quarter since the beginning of 2011, according to data exchanged under the EDF-RAN. The number of detections nearly doubled between the third and fourth quarters of 2012, coinciding exactly with the launch of the Greek operation Aspida and in the current reporting period detections have reached unprecedented levels.



By far the most commonly detected documents on flights from Turkey in Q2 2013 were authentic Swedish passports which were used as impostors mostly detected at Stockholm Arlanda Airport. Following recent increases, in Q2 2013 Copenhagen Airport detected the most document fraudsters arriving from Turkish Airports (34), followed by Düsseldorf (33) and Fiumicino (32).

#### **4.2.5. Circular migration from Albania to Greece**

In Q2 2013, Greece reported a 157% increase (compared to the previous quarter) in detections of illegal border-crossing at its land borders with Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which represented a 72% increase in relation to the second quarter a year previously.

This substantial increase broke the stable situation in place since the first quarter 2011, when visa liberalisation was granted for Albanians. Prior to visa liberalisation, detections ranged between 6 000 and 12 000 per quarter. However, since Q1 2011, quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing were under 2 000 detections.

The introduction of visa liberalisation went together with a small increase in refusals of entry as more Albanians crossed the border at BCP. In Q2 2013, refusals of entry remained stable, as can be seen on the graph. The same graph also shows the strong seasonal variations, with summer-peak corresponding to the period of temporary work in Greece for migrants from Albania.

Albanians were also detected in large numbers at their land border with Greece using counterfeit border-crossing-stamps in their passports in order to fabricate travel histories and extend periods of stay. This

phenomenon was so extensive that Albanians are ranked top for document fraud at the EU level (see Section 4.8. Document fraud for more details).

#### **4.2.6. Western Mediterranean route**

In Q2 2013 there were over 1 000 detections of illegal border-crossing in the Western Mediterranean region, which consists of several areas of the southern Spanish coast as well as the land borders of Ceuta and Melilla from where three-quarters of all detections were reported.

Since Q2 2012, detections on this route have remained fairly stable – between 1 500 and 2 000 detections per quarter. However, diverging trends are noticeable in detections at land and sea borders, probably associated with more prevention of departures at sea by the Moroccan authorities, as well as strengthened measures in the Mediterranean Sea, including through JO EPN Indalo. Migrants' preference for avoiding sea crossings is further supported by the fact that, unlike in the Central Mediterranean area, the improvement of weather conditions in June did not result in significant increase in detections at sea.

Since Q1 2012, detections at the land border (mostly along the fence in Melilla) far outnumbered detections at the sea border. The Spanish authorities have been reporting for several months the growing number of migrants established near Melilla. In Q2 2013, but mostly in July 2013, subsequent to the reporting period, attempts to cross the fence in Melilla have increased to such an extent that the Spanish authorities have had to reinforce the number of police officers and additional equipment devoted to border surveillance.

At the end of June, the government representative in Melilla, Abdelmalik El Barkani,

said at a press conference that the migrants had attacked the fence 'very aggressively' and had thrown rocks at Moroccan security forces which, in addition to Guardia Civil, have detained migrants who had not yet made it to the autonomous city. There have been many sightings of sub-Saharan Africans who had not yet reached the fence, according to the Spanish Authorities. For the last few months, the government has warned of the permanent threat of migration to Melilla. Once in Melilla, migrants are turned over to Police Headquarters for identification, and many are transferred to the Temporary Stay Centre for Immigrants (CETI – Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes).

In Q2 2013, most of the detections at the sea border on the Western Mediterranean route were from Mali and Algeria. Sub-Saharan often stage their journeys, sometimes for years, to work in low-paid jobs to finance their travel. As for Algerians, they often mentioned having relatives in Spain or France.

Analysing the nationalities detected on this route is problematic as half the detections from Ceuta and Melilla land border were reported by the Spanish authorities as being of unknown nationality. However open sources suggest that there have been increased reports of African migrants storming the border fence in Melilla.

#### 4.2.7. Western African route

In the second quarter of 2013, there were only few detections of illegal border-crossing in this region, consistent with the level reported during the same period in 2012. Compared to last year, there were much fewer migrants from Morocco but more from Mali.

Irregular migration pressure on the West African route continued to be much reduced compared the situation before 2010. Sus-



Figure 13. The CETI in Melilla can accommodate up to 480 migrants

tained high level of surveillance ensuring early detections and collaboration with third-country authorities are key to maintaining the low level of detections at the border.

#### 4.2.8. Eastern land borders route

The eastern land borders route is, in effect, an amalgam of detections of illegal border-crossing reported by Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Finland and Latvia. Despite the total length of all the border sections, detections tend to be lower than on other routes possibly due to the long distances between major hubs and countries of origin. Visa fraud and counterfeit border-crossing stamps tend to predominate on this route, as opposed to detections of illegal border-crossing (see Section 4.8. Document fraud).

In Q2 2013, there were just 338 detections of illegal border-crossing at the eastern land borders of the EU, which more than the previous quarter but less compared to a year previously. Since 2009, detections of illegal border-crossing ranged between 100 and 600 per quarter. Typically, detections on the Eastern land border are lowest during the winter months, when weather conditions prevent most of illegal border-cross-



Figure 14. In July 2013, the Romanian Border Police detected two groups of Syrians who had illegally crossed the border from Turkey to Romania across the Black Sea. It is the first time that such incidents were reported in the Black Sea. In both cases, the migrants relied on the services of Turkish facilitators

ing along the green border, and gradually increase to reach a peak during the summer months.

In Q2 2013, about one third of the detections were reported from the land border between Slovakia and Ukraine, and nearly as many from the land border between Lithuania and Belarus. Since 2008, these two border sections often reported the most detections. Since 2010, the land border between Estonia and the Russian Federation has often been on the top three border sections for detections of illegal border-crossing on the Eastern land border.

The top ranking nationality was Georgian, mostly detected crossing illegally the land border between Lithuania and Belarus, followed by Moldovans and Vietnamese.

In their bi-monthly analytical report, the Estonian authorities mentioned the continued report of incidents of irregular migration associated with Vietnamese nationals in areas outside of BCPS. According to intelligence obtained during investigation, there are significant numbers of Vietnamese, including minors, waiting in the Russian Federation to illegally enter the EU. Most of these migrants left Vietnam several months or even

years ago. They worked in the Russian Federation in the construction industry and in clothing manufacturers. In neighbouring Lithuania, Vietnamese migrants continued to be among the most often detected for illegal border-crossing at the land border with Belarus. Poland also reported the existence of Vietnamese migrants organising their illegal entry to the EU via the Russian Federation. Many Vietnamese were detected on secondary movements while entering Poland from Lithuania.

#### 4.2.9. Black Sea route

Detections of illegal border-crossing on the Black Sea are extremely rare, but Bulgaria reported one attempt of clandestine entry at Varna sea port in June, and subsequent to the reporting period, in July 2013, Romania reported two incidents involving the detection of 59 Syrians aided by four Turkish facilitators attempting to reach the Romanian coast.

Subsequent to the reporting period, on 6 July 2013, a sailing boat carrying Syrians was detected by the Romanian Border Police close to Mangalia and two Turkish facilitators were apprehended. On 27 July, another group of



Syrians was detected, again with two Turkish facilitators, close to Costinesti.

These two incidents still constitute isolated cases, but they reveal possible increasing pressure of irregular migration from Turkey across the Black Sea. They are possibly linked to the increased surveillance on the Eastern Mediterranean route and the increasing number of migrants waiting in Turkey to reach the EU illegally.

### 4.3. Clandestine entry

Restricting the FRAN indicator on detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs (1B) to the external land and sea borders of the EU and to detections confirmed to be clandestine entries (e.g. hiding in means of transport), results in extremely low detections for the whole of the EU especially compared with other indicators, such as detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs. For example, in Q2 2013 only 118 detections were reported from the whole FRAN community, down by nearly 10% compared to the previous quarter and down 6% compared to the second quarter of 2012.

In the case of Slovenia, from where most of the detections were reported in each quarter for the last year, detections at the border with Croatia actually fell compared to Q1, but the total was similar to Q2 2012. Most of the migrants detected hiding at the Slovenian border with Croatia were Algerians.

Detections increased markedly at the land border between Hungary and Serbia, and mostly included Afghans. Nearly all of these Afghan migrants were making secondary movements after initially entering the Schengen area in Greece.

In Bulgaria the increased detections of clandestine entries at BCPs were due to more

migrants from Syria, who were increasingly detected at the land border with Turkey – probably as a displacement effect from the Greek land border with Turkey.

In contrast to the low number of detections of clandestine entry at the external border, there were more detections within the EU/Schengen area (349). Although higher than for the external border, this figure was a reduction of around 15% compared to the previous quarter. The geographical distribution of these 'internal' detections sheds important light on the direction of secondary movements and the final destination countries selected by each nationality. For example, the UK and Italy reported the greatest number of internally detected clandestine irregular migrants.

### 4.4. Detections of facilitators

Notwithstanding a small increase compared to the previous quarter (+5%), detections of facilitators of irregular migration have been falling steadily for the last two years. According to some reports, this long-term decline may in part be due to a widespread shift towards the abuse of legal channels and document fraud to mimic legal entry to the EU, which results in facilitators being able to operate remotely and inconspicuously rather than accompanying migrants during high-risk activities such as border-crossing.

The long-term decreasing trend in detections of facilitators is roughly consistent with the decreasing trend in detections of illegal stays, as can be seen in Figure 15. This is also an indication that a large number of facilitation cases in the EU are linked with facilitation of illegal stay rather than with facilitation of illegal border-crossing. Indeed, a large share of detections of facilitators corresponds to detections in Member States that have limited or no land or sea external borders, like France.



Figure 15. **The long-term decreasing trend in detections of facilitators is also consistent with the decreasing trend in detections of illegal stay**

Quarterly detections of facilitators and illegal stay since the beginning of 2008



Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

Consistent with this long-term decline, in Q2 2013, there were 1 705 detections of facilitators of irregular migration, down 4.5% compared to the second quarter of 2012. The same group of five Member States (France, Italy, Spain, Greece and Hungary) continue to share the bulk; together they accounted for more than 80% of all detections of facilitators at the EU level.

The biggest increase in detections in Q2 2013 was observed in Hungary. Most of these detections were of Hungarian nationals and were associated with illegal border-crossings from Serbia, which increased in the second half of 2013.

Member States tend to detect more domestic facilitators than any other nationality; very often most of the top reporting countries for this indicator tend to report their own citizens as facilitators more frequently than any other single nationality. In line with this tendency, the top three nationalities of facilitators detected in specific Member States were Italians detected in Italy, French detected in France, and Spanish detected in Spain.

#### 4.5. Detections of illegal stay

In Q2 2013, there were over 80 000 detections of illegal stay in the EU, which is a

slight increase of 4% compared to the previous quarter but a decrease of 6% compared to the same quarter in 2012. Except for the previous quarter, this figure was among the lowest ever reported for this indicator\*, and is consistent with the previously reported slightly declining long-term trend since 2008 (Fig. 1). However, this long-term decline masks much variation among Member States.

The vast majority of migrants staying illegally were detected inland and so are presumed to be long-term illegal stayers as, at the time of detection, they were making no attempt to leave. The next most common location for detections of illegal stayers was those exiting at the air followed by the land borders whereby illegally staying migrants were leaving the EU or Schengen area and may have included those that were over staying by short periods.

The largest increase between Q1 and Q2, both in terms of volume and in relative terms, was reported by Hungary. This increase was associated with the increase in detections of illegal border-crossing at the land border between Hungary and Serbia. After detection most migrants applied for asylum and then absconded. Four nationalities showed significant increases be-

\* Some of this decline was due to changes in reporting practices in the Netherlands

Figure 16. **Migrants from Chechnya travelled to Moscow and then by train to Poland and further on to Germany**



tween Q1 and Q2: from Kosovo\*, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Algeria.

For the fourth consecutive quarter, Germany reported by far the most detections of migrants staying illegally. In Q2, detections of illegal stay in Germany increased by 14% compared to the previous quarter, mostly due to increase of Russians (mostly of Chechen origin). This increase in Russians staying illegally was associated with a large number of Chechens initially refused entry in Poland then applying for asylum in Poland, but whose final destination was Germany (see Fig. 16). The reason for this increase is not yet fully understood but is apparently linked to a rumour that spread in Chechnya about Germany granting asylum to Russians of Chechen origin.

In Q2, Moroccans remained the most commonly detected as illegal stayers in the EU, mostly reported by Spain and France. Russians replaced Afghans on the second rank in Q2. Ranking fifth, Afghans actually recorded their lowest number since 2008, mostly in France.

#### 4.6. Refusals of entry

In Q2 2013 there were 33 216 refusals of entry at the external border, an increase of over 19% compared to the previous quarter and the quarter a year ago. In fact, in the context of recent years this figure is one of the largest ever recorded (with the exception of Q3 2009 totalling 34 365). Most of the increase was at the land border and thus refusals of entry at the land border represented more

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



than 60% of all refusals compared to about half of the total in previous quarters.

The increase was due to extremely large number of Russians of Chechen origin refused entry because of lack of visas at the train BCP on the Polish border with Belarus. Immediately after being refused entry, they applied for asylum in Poland, but then travelled to Germany where they also applied for asylum. Other Member States, notably Austria, France, Sweden and Belgium, also reported an increase in asylum application of Chechens, although in smaller numbers.

The phenomenon started in March and reached its peak in May 2013, and mostly concerned migrants travelling in family units. Virtually all refusals of entry took place at the train BCP of Terespol through which trains travel between Minsk and Warsaw. Upon applying for asylum, fingerprints were taken and the migrants were provided with travel documents to reach asylum centres in Poland, mostly in Biała Podlaska at 30 km from Terespol. However, most migrants continued their journey to Germany by train, relying on facilitation services that provided them transport by roads to Germany.

In Germany, most migrants applied again for asylum. They were also registered and their fingerprints found in the EURODAC database. They were thus ordered to return to Poland, their first place of asylum application.

As of June the trends on all three indicators went down, indicating a clear decreasing trend that was confirmed by information received in July. It can thus be assumed that this phenomenon was temporary.

The reasons behind this sudden and large increase are not fully understood. There was no particular security or political incidents

in Chechnya immediately before and during that period, and the economic situation, while relatively poor, did not change drastically either. This sudden flow could have been triggered by rumours spreading in Chechnya about Germany granting asylum to Russians of Chechen origins.

Indeed, Russian newspapers have published several articles commenting on the German Constitutional Court's decision mandating all federal units in Germany to calculate basic benefits under the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act based on general provisions applicable to all persons who receive social benefits. These articles were mentioning significant financial benefits for asylum seekers and their families. In addition to these press announcements, rumours have also spread among Russian nationals from Chechnya that they have high chance of obtaining residence permit in Germany.

In Germany, most Russians claiming asylum received negative outcomes. In 2012, the recognition rate of asylum applications of Russians was 22% at the EU level and only 17% in Germany.

On their side, the Belarusian authorities appeared to do minimum efforts to prevent exit of migrants transiting through Belarus. In its bi-monthly analytical report, Estonia pointed to the fact that since October 2012, due to the freezing in EU assistance to Belarusian border-control authorities, Belarus has suspended the identification of irregular migrants moving to EU countries. The minimum collaboration from the Belarusian counterpart probably also contributed to the development of this phenomenon at the Polish border.

It is not the first time that a similar outbreak of illegal entry occurred at the land border between Poland and Belarus, comprised of the same combination of refusals of entry

followed by asylum applications in order to stay illegally in the EU. In 2009, from June to September, a large number of Georgians were refused entry at the same border section, who then applied for asylum before absconding to other Member States.

These random surges of migrants are very difficult to predict and even more difficult to prevent. Indeed, border-control authorities alone cannot prevent these kinds of flows and so at least part of the solution requires the coordination of efforts with asylum authorities and national police authorities at a national and EU level.

Elsewhere, refusals of entry were relatively stable compared to previous quarters. The main grounds for refusals of entry was the lack of visas (13 891) followed by the lack of justification for the purpose of stay. Albanians continued to rank first at the air border where they were mostly refused at Italian airports.

#### 4.7. Asylum claims

Compared to the previous quarter, the number of asylum claims reported within the FRAN increased by 17% to a total of 85 362 applications in Q2 2013. This was also an increase of 43% compared to the second quarter of 2012. (Note: the FRAN data do not include asylum applications submitted inland in France or the Netherlands).


Much of the increase was due to more asylum applications submitted by Russians of Chechen origin in Poland and then again in Germany (see Section 4.6. Refusals of entry). In total, the number of applications of Russians increased from 7 010 applications in the first quarter 2013 to 15 453 applications in the second quarter. Most of these applications are of the same individuals who first applied in Poland and then in Germany.

Hungary also reported a staggering increase in asylum applications, one of the most spectacular increases recorded in the FRAN. This increase coincided with the change in legislation in the Hungary asylum policy that entered into force in January 2013. According to this amendment, the lodging of an asylum application and the start of an asylum procedure constitutes an explicit ban on expulsion and removal from the territory. Asylum-seekers who immediately ask for asylum upon being apprehended by the police (before the end of their first interview), between January and June 2013, were not detained. Instead, pursuant to the modifications that entered into force in January, in order to harmonise the Hungarian asylum policy with EU standards, first-time asylum applicants were all accommodated in an open facility.

The migrants who used this *modus operandi* to enter the EU can be classified into two categories: first, those making secondary movements through the Western Balkans after entering illegally the EU in Greece, mostly Afghans, Pakistanis and Syrians. Second were those from the Western Balkan region, mostly from Kosovo.\* For both categories of migrants, the number of detections of illegal border-crossing and asylum applications sharply increased after January 2013.

Subsequent to the reporting period, in July 2013 further amendments were introduced in the Hungarian asylum policy, in particular detailing the specific list of grounds for detention of asylum applicants in closed centres. Grounds for asylum detention under the new rules include: (a) For the verification of the applicant's identity and nationality; (b) The asylum-seeker absconded or hinders the processing of the asylum procedure in any other way; (c) In order to obtain the information necessary for the processing of the asylum claim, if there are serious grounds to presume that the asylum-seeker would delay or hinder the pro-

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



On 8 July 2013, EASO released its second Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the EU, covering the year 2012. The report aims to provide comprehensive overview of the situation of asylum in the EU, looking at the flows of applicants for international protection in the EU, analysing application and decision data, and focusing on some of the most important countries of origin of applicants for international protection in 2012. The report underlines the wildly different characteristics of asylum applicants in the EU, notably among applicants from Afghanistan, Syria and the Western Balkan countries.

In 2013, there were 335 365 asylum applications in the EU, of these 260 575 were 'new' applicants for international protection. Afghanistan continued to be the most numerous overall in the EU, and included large number of unaccompanied minors. Syria showed the largest increase in applications due to the deteriorating security situation in Syria over the course of the year. The report underlines that when summed together, applicants from the six Western Balkan countries, continued to represent the highest number of applications made in the EU for asylum (more than Afghanistan and Syria combined), despite the fact that Member States judged such applications to well-founded in only 4% of cases overall. EASO will publish a comprehensive report on the Western Balkans in the second half of 2013.

Source: easo.europa.eu



### Swiss back tighter asylum rules

Almost 80% of voters approved changes made to the asylum law last September, final results of a referendum said. Under the new rules military desertion is no longer a reason for granting asylum, and people cannot now apply through Swiss foreign embassies. About 48 000 people are in the process of seeking asylum in Switzerland, twice the European average per head of population.



Source: BBC News, 9 June 2013

cedure or would abscond; (d) In order to protect the public order and national security; (e) If the claim has been submitted at the airport; (f) The applicant has repeatedly failed to fulfil his/her obligation to attend procedural acts and thus hinders the processing of a Dublin procedure. It should be noted that asylum-seeking unaccompanied minors cannot be detained.

Information received from the Hungarian authorities and Frontex Joint Operations active at the land border between Hungary and Serbia showed that the number of detections of illegal border-crossing fell markedly in the first few weeks of July. It is thus expected that the flow of migrants detected crossing the border illegally will decrease in the third quarter 2013. In Bulgaria, the number of asylum applications also rose sharply, although from a lower base, which was mostly due to Syrian nationals.

The number of Syrians applying for asylum in the EU as a whole decreased slightly compared to the previous quarter, by 5.5%. In Q2 2013, a total of 7 917 Syrians applied for asylum, mainly in Sweden.

### New Greek asylum service

An important step in the reform of the Greek asylum system was reached on 7 June with the opening of the Asylum Service and the

setting up of 19 Appeal Committees under the new Appeals Authority, managing the backlog of pending appeals. The First Reception Centre in Fylakio has been fully operational on the same day. Two additional centres with a capacity of 200 and 120 places, respectively, are under construction in Lesbos and Attiki and will be fully operational by the end of 2013.

The reform of the asylum system in Greece is currently in a transitional stage, during which the asylum-procedure continued to be carried out by the police and the transfer to the new services is being prepared. Under the new system, the Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection and its services as well as the Directorate for Social Perception and Solidarity of the Ministry of Labor, will be competent for the reception of asylum-seekers and unaccompanied children.

#### **Dublin III**

On 29 June 2013, the EC Regulation 343/2003, known as Dublin II, was recast. The new regulation, Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, known as Dublin III, was jointly adopted by the European Parliament and the European Council. It entered into force 19 July 2013 and shall apply to applications lodged six months following its entry into force.

This recast is part of the development of the Common European Asylum System. This new regulation will contribute to harmonising practices in place in Member States. It contains a new right to information for asylum applicants, introduces a personal interview and put an obligation on the European Commission to produce a common information leaflet. It also contains a new provision on judicial remedies for asylum seekers to challenge Dublin decisions where transfers would not be in compliance with their fundamental rights.

## **4.8. Document fraud**

In Q2 2013 there were just over 2 300 detections of document fraud on entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries, which is an increase of 8% compared to a year previously in Q2 2012. However, France exchanged usable data for the first time in 2013, which inevitably inflated the figures to a certain degree, particularly on entry from third countries; omitting the French data actually resulted in a slight decrease in detections at the external border compared to a year previously.

Spain, France, Greece and Germany reported the most detections on entry at the external border together accounting for around half of all detections at the EU level. Spain reported more detections than ever before, but this increase was difficult to analyse as it was mostly due to unknown nationalities arriving at Madrid Barajas Airport from unknown airports.

### **Royal Netherlands Marechaussee Identity Documents (ID) Desk(s)**

On 31 May 2013 four Royal Netherlands Marechaussee ID Desks were opened at Eindhoven, Rotterdam, Schiphol and Zwolle. They will provide document expertise on the highest level to the National Police in the fight against identity fraud. The information collected by the ID desks and future desks of the National Police will be gathered at the Identity Fraud and Documents Centre of Expertise (ECID). This cooperation adds significant value to trends and analyses in the search of suspects of fraud.



\* Blue passports are official passports issued to Pakistani nationals who are Senators, Members of the National Assembly, Provincial Ministers, Judges of the Supreme/High Courts, Officers serving with the Government on official assignment abroad etc.

“ At least 2 000 [Pakistani] blue passports\* were allegedly either sold to influential people at a hefty price ... or issued to undeserving officials between July 2010 and February 2013

Sources said a powerful 'gang' comprising of at least one former federal minister, many senior officials of the Ministry of Interior and Directorate General of Immigration and Passports allegedly made billions out of the sale of diplomatic Pakistani passports.

Director General of the Directorate General of Immigration and Passports Zulfiqar Cheema said, 'At this point in time I can confirm that investigations are underway into the case and we have recommended in writing to the interior division to cancel 2 000 passports issued to private individuals by the [former] PPP regime.'

It is generally believed that a vast majority of those who purchased the blue passports have already left Pakistan and the cancellation of their passports is a futile exercise.

Source: [tribune.com.pk](http://tribune.com.pk), 20 May 2013



As well as at the external border, also important at the EU level were the detections of document fraud between the Schengen area and non-Schengen EU Member States. As is normally the case, many of these were reported on entry to the UK, a common destination country for irregular migrants travelling from the Schengen area.

The EDF-RAN data exchange also considers detections of document fraud on intra-Schengen flights whereby no border checks are systematically performed. In Q2 2013 there were 775 detections of document fraud on flights between Schengen airports, which is



“ Cypriot police struggling with bogus marriages

Larnaca District Court sentenced in May four people in connection with the charges in a fictitious marriage. Two women from Bulgaria at the age of 24 and 30 years, respectively, the 27-year-old man from the Republic of Bangladesh and the 37-year-old man from Sri Lanka are accused of conspiring to commit a crime, as well as aiding and abetting illegal entry and stay in the Republic of Cyprus. The four were arrested in Larnaca, where they had gathered for the wedding of Bulgarian women and men from Bangladesh.

Source: [cyplive.com](http://cyplive.com), 31 May 2013



a slight increase following the lowest ever level during the previous quarter. The decrease during the first few months of 2013 was widely recognised to be associated with the Greek operation Aspida at the Greek land border with Turkey, which prevented many migrants from entering Greece from Turkey and then boarding intra-Schengen flights in Athens.

### Migrants from Albania

In Q2 2013 some 725 Albanians were detected using more than 900 fraudulent documents, which is a decrease compared to other reporting periods over the last year. Nevertheless, Albanians still represent the biggest proportion of document fraud at the EU level.

Albanians were mostly detected on entry to the Schengen area from a third country (253)



but also travelling between the Schengen area and non-Schengen EU Member States (138). The latter flow was almost exclusively between the Schengen area and the UK, sometimes via Ireland.

Overall Greece detected more Albanians than any other Member State, mostly on entry at the Greek BCPs Kakavia and Kristalopigi, but at a much reduced rate compared to a year previously in Q2 2012.

#### **Migrants from Syria**

Overall, some 557 Syrians were detected using fraudulent documents in Q2 2013, which is one of the highest ever recorded numbers for this nationality and more than double the number reported a year ago in Q2 2012. Syrians were mostly detected on entry to the Schengen area from third countries (278), which is in contrast to a year previously when they were mostly detected on intra-Schengen flights. Following continued increases over the last year, their most common embarkation point in Q2 2013 was Istanbul (173), particularly on flights to a range of Germany airports. Hence, Germany detected more Syrians than any other Member State, followed by Greece, where in both countries detections were distributed among several airports.

#### **Legal channels**

Although lacking a systematic data exchange among Member States, many reports conclude that the abuse of legal channels to illegally enter the EU is increasing.

### **4.9. Returns**

#### **4.9.1. Return decisions**

In Q2 2013 there were 53 586 third-country nationals subject to an obligation to leave the EU as a result of an administrative or judicial

decision, which is a decrease of a fifth compared to during the same period in 2012. The UK reached more decisions to leave than any other Member State, but there were more Pakistanis that were subject to a decision to leave in Greece (1 694) than any other nationality in a single Member State.


Most of the overall decrease was due to fewer decisions being made in Greece, where throughout 2012, more decisions to leave were reached than in any other Member State. Most of these decisions to leave were handed to migrants after they were detected illegally crossing the land border between Greece and Turkey. During the first half of 2012 detections of illegal border-crossing in this region were very significant at the EU level, but have subsequently fallen to very low levels (see Section 4.2.4 Eastern Mediterranean route); correspondingly the number of return decisions reached in Greece also fell down, affecting figures for the EU as a whole.

Note that the absolute total number of migrants subject to return decisions is still underestimated by this indicator, as data on decisions were unavailable from, *inter alia*, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, where it is assumed that high numbers of decisions were reached.

Notwithstanding return decisions reached in Greece, there was very little change in the number of decisions made by other Member States. The UK for instance reported little change in the number of return decisions reached, and while some other Member States reported changes of between -20 and +20%, these changes were within the range of previous reporting periods.

More Albanians were subject to decisions to leave than any other nationality (4 588), followed by Pakistanis (4 034), Moroccans (3 242) and Indians (2 624). Albanians and

Figure 17. **The most commonly returned migrants were from Albania, Pakistan and Morocco**  
Effective returns and return decision issued for top 20 nationalities in Q2 2013



Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

Pakistanis were mostly issued decision to leave in Greece.

At the Member State level there is often a discrepancy between the number of return decisions reached and the number of effective returns carried out. Some of the differences may be due to time lags between judicial decisions and actual returns, while other differences may be due to the disappearance of migrants once a decision has been reached.

#### 4.9.2. Effective returns

In Q2 2013, there continued to be a steady trend in the number of third-country nationals effectively returned to outside the EU compared to most previous quarters in 2012 and 2013. The total number of 39 741 was in the range that varied between 38 000 and 42 000 per quarters, showing a small increase of 4% compared to the previous quarter.

As has been the case during every quarter of data exchange so far for this indicator, the UK conducted the largest number of returns, in

this case down by 3% compared to the previous quarter. Greece, ranking second, mostly reported the effective return of Albanians.

#### 4.10. Other illegal activities at the border

Information gathered through Frontex Joint Operations and Member State bi-monthly reports in Q2 2013 shows a continuously high level of criminal activities at the EU external borders and, in the case of stolen vehicles detected on exit and cigarette smuggling, a substantial increase.

At the EU eastern borders, cigarette smuggling remained the most often reported criminal activity in Q2 2013. It regained momentum with the end of winter and the season-related higher accessibility of areas along the land border. Recent detections show that some criminal groups involved in this illicit trade used their large proceeds to invest in technical solutions such as an unmanned raft equipped with an electronic navigation system.

At the EU external borders to the Western Balkans, law-enforcement operations in Q2 2013 confirmed that some criminal groups from that region continued to use their existing smuggling infrastructure to gradually move into the cocaine trade.

In Q2 2013, with the season-related resumption of Frontex Joint Operations in the Mediterranean, more consistent information on the smuggling of excise goods and drugs fed into the quarterly analysis of illegal activities along the southern sea borders of the EU.

#### **4.10.1. Trafficking in human beings (THB)**

The Spanish Cuerpo Nacional de Policia developed a plan against trafficking in human beings for the purpose of sexual exploitation, which entered into force in April. In consideration of the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of THB (2012–2016), the plan is based on the following priorities: enhancing the prevention of THB; enhancing the identification and detection of potential victims; increasing the prosecution of traffickers; in depth examination and analysis of all aspects of THB; adjusting and optimising software tools for the analysis of THB; and strengthening national and international cooperation for the eradication of THB.

At the beginning of July, the Spanish authorities disrupted an organised crime group and arrested six of its Nigerian members. The organisation was responsible for transporting Nigerian women from deprived areas in Benin City to Spain for the purpose of sexual exploitation. The whole journey took between four and five months. They were usually recruited on African soil through partial deception, which means that they presumably knew they were going to work in the sex business, but were deceived by false promises of good working conditions and large earnings. After their overland travel to the Moroccan coast,

they were smuggled in small boats across the Strait of Gibraltar into Spain (mainly Cataluña and Málaga). The investigation revealed the use of physical coercion and psychological pressure, e.g. through 'juju' rituals.

In June, the French authorities dismantled a Nigerian criminal organisation, which had forced more than 100 Nigerian women into prostitution. The arrested traffickers were responsible for performing different tasks, such as the organisation of activities, the facilitation of travel, the accommodation of victims and the forgery of documents. Less typical of Nigerian groups dealing with THB was the involvement of a priest who kept in touch with the victims and provided them with fraudulent documents supporting their asylum applications. Already in May 2012, one of the heads of the organisation had been arrested in the UK.

#### **4.10.2. Smuggling of tobacco products**

##### **Eastern borders**

Large differences in cigarette taxes between the EU countries and their eastern neighbours maximised the proceeds from this illegal trade, which is conducted on several organisational levels from small smugglers crossing the border with cigarettes in their private vehicles to large criminal organisations that systematically transport large amounts in commercial lorries. While a pack of cigarettes currently costs between EUR 2.60 and 2.90 in Estonia and up to EUR 11.50 in Norway, it would only cost between EUR 1.30 and 1.50 in the Russian Federation.

If the Russian Ministry of Finance raises the tax on tobacco by 50% as planned at the beginning of 2014, these price differences will decrease. This measure would raise the price of an average pack of cigarettes to approximately EUR 2.10, which would reduce the



© Ukrainian Border Guard Service

Figure 18. **Ukrainian border guards detected more than 1.24 million cigarettes about to be smuggled across the River Bug to Poland**

profits of smugglers. In order to fight health hazards and to adapt taxation levels in the Russian Federation to the European average, the WHO even proposes a sevenfold hike in excise duties on tobacco until 2020. However, cigarettes in Belarus and Kazakhstan continue to be considerably cheaper, so the existing Customs Union with these countries will ensure a steady flow of tobacco products to the Russian Federation. For this reason, the amount of tobacco products illegally brought into the EU is not expected to decrease considerably as long as the excise tax policies in the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation and in other countries in the region such as Ukraine and Moldova are not harmonised.

Most seized contraband passing through BCPs was found in luggage compartments of private vehicle, often those with tinted windows. Double walls, spare wheels and secret compartments in doors or other parts of the cars were also used to hide cigarettes. Passenger trains were regularly used to smuggle comparably smaller amounts of cigarettes, which were hidden under seats and beds or in the ceiling.

In April, Lithuanian authorities raided a farm building near Kaunas, where they found 6.9 million cigarettes of the brands 'Jin Ling', 'New Line', 'Bayron' and 'Bayron Light' with Rus-

sian excise stamps affixed. Eight persons, one Russian and seven Lithuanians, aged between 29 and 45 were arrested. The cigarettes had been previously smuggled from the Kaliningrad Oblast through the BCP of Kybartai. The record amount seized in this case is in line with a recent upward trend registered by the local authorities. According to the Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior, in comparison to the same period in 2012, the amount of smuggled cigarettes seized by authorities between January and mid-May 2013 rose by 87%, thus exceeding one million packs.

Also in June, Romanian authorities made their largest discovery of smuggled cigarettes in the last three years. In the town of Vicsani, more than two million cigarettes were found on a freight train from Ukraine. The contraband was hidden within thoroughly hollowed wood logs. The logs were filled with packs of cigarettes connected by a rope for easy retrieval and placed on two of the several railway cars. The contraband could only be detected after a careful examination and fragmentation of the logs.

The border authorities of third countries substantially contributed to the fight against the smuggling of excise goods into the EU. At the end of June 2013, Ukrainian border guards detected suspicious activities at the Polish border near the BCP of Dorohusk. After a closer examination, they found several persons unloading boxes from two minivans into a rubber boat. The boxes were supposed to be transported across the river Bug to Poland (see Fig. 18). Eventually, authorities arrested seven persons and seized more than 1.24 million cigarettes produced in the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

#### **Western Mediterranean and West African routes**

The Western Mediterranean Sea showed to be significantly affected by the smug-

gling of tobacco products during the reporting period.

In Q2 2013, law-enforcement authorities performed an operation to tackle the smuggling of tobacco products in Spain, Portugal, France and Belgium. This was considered to be one of the largest operations of the current year and it resulted in 2 668 250 packs of cigarettes being seized and 13 persons arrested in the Spanish cities of Seville, Algeciras and Valencia, and also in France and Portugal. The criminal network, which was composed of Spanish, Belgian, Irish and British citizens, had the capacity to act on a global scale and it is believed that the organisation had the ability to smuggle at least ten containers of tobacco per month. The criminal group reportedly gained 1.1 million in profits per container of the contraband.

The tobacco products were mainly produced in Asia and then shipped to Europe via African countries to the ports of Algeciras, Valencia, Antwerp and Lisbon. In order to hide and distribute the contraband, the criminal organisation created a business structure composed of several front companies responsible for performing business transactions and false tax returns. Therefore, once the tobacco was in EU territory it was distributed to several EU countries through the logistics network of the companies.

#### **4.10.3. Drug trafficking**

##### **Western Balkans**

Western Balkan countries play a significant role as the main entry point of heroin from Afghanistan to Europe. As the supply of heroin from Afghanistan and demand in Western Europe has been decreasing, criminal groups appear to be trying to compensate for their losses by expanding the scope of their business. The World Drug Report 2013 re-

leased in June 2013 by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime highlights a growing number of cocaine seizures conducted in countries all along the Balkan route, including Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Albania, Hungary and Austria. Criminal organisations in Turkey originally smuggling heroin increasingly added cocaine trafficking to their repertoire, and reports from the Western Balkans show that groups in other countries are following suit. According to UNODC, criminal groups from West Africa are often involved in this trade as a large part of the substance transits Africa before its arrival on the Balkans route. In other cases, the cocaine arrives on container ships from South American countries such as Brazil. However, the amount of cocaine arriving in the EU from the Western Balkans is by far outnumbered by quantities entering the EU through the Iberian Peninsula.

In the second quarter of 2013, several criminal networks involved in the smuggling of cocaine and heroin were disrupted in the Balkans. On 8 May, the FYROM, German and Austrian police arrested five persons in the course of the joint operation 'Dirigent'. The crime group, which was known as the 'Frankfurt Mafia', trafficked heroin from Afghanistan along the Balkan route to major cities in the EU. The criminal organisation was composed of decentralised cells with different roles assigned, ranging from transporting, receiving and selling the drugs to laundering the proceeds, which was done by fast money transfers to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

At the end of May 2013 an international police operation was simultaneously conducted in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and the Netherlands. It led to the arrest of several persons of different nationality who smuggled and sold large amounts of cocaine from Latin America. The group was also involved in the pro-



duction of marijuana, as police confiscated over 1 500 cannabis plants. Around EUR 1 million was seized during the operation.

Earlier in May, Kosovo\* police arrested the head of a transnational criminal organisation which was involved in drug trafficking and distribution for many years. The arrest was based on an international warrant issued by Bosnia and Herzegovina. The suspect reportedly started his criminal business through the smuggling of tobacco products and gradually became involved in the trafficking of heroin and cocaine through Turkey, Albania, Kosovo\*, Montenegro, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. His family members own numerous companies in these countries, through which the proceeds of crime were allegedly laundered.

The Western Balkans continue to play an important role in cannabis trafficking both as a region of transit and origin. Firstly, this route is used to smuggle cannabis from Afghanistan to the EU. According to the UNODC World Drug Report 2013, global seizures of Afghan cannabis increased between 2002 and 2011, but production remained rather stable since 2009. Secondly, the increasing production of cannabis in Albania makes the region an important supplier of the EU market.

In Q2 2013, assets deployed through Frontex Joint Operations uncovered numerous attempts to smuggle cannabis products from Western Balkan countries into the EU. Border guards seized more than 205 kg of marijuana in 17 different cases. The substance was hidden in luggage, behind double walls or in secret compartments of private vehicles, e.g. in the steering wheel or under the dashboard. In some cases, minor amounts were hidden on the person, in luggage compartments or under seats of public buses.

### Western Mediterranean and West African routes

The Iberian Peninsula, due to its geographical proximity to North Africa and a long coastline, represents a major entry point of illicit drugs smuggled into the EU. Seizures in Q2 2013 confirmed that Spain plays a major role in the transit of drugs which are subsequently distributed to the whole European market.

According to the UNODC World Drug Report 2013, Spain accounted for 34% of the global seizures of hashish in 2011. Hashish, which mainly arrives in the Iberian Peninsula from Morocco, is the drug that is most frequently seized through police operations (see Fig. 19). Cocaine is either smuggled to Spain directly by sea and air from Latin America, or transited through West or North African countries. From Spain, large quantities of these drugs are transported in lorries to the rest of Europe for street distribution. The traffickers use several different routes and sophisticated concealment methods making the detection of these activities difficult.


To avoid detection traffickers usually use rubber speedboats, fishing boats and jet skies to smuggle narcotics from North Africa to the Spanish coast. However, to transport large amounts of drugs on longer distances, e.g. from South America, commercial cargo ships are usually used.

On 2 May, agents of Guardia Civil conducted an operation in the provinces of Málaga and Cádiz, which led to the seizure of almost 500 kg of hashish and the arrest of 30 suspects of Spanish, Moroccan and Italian nationality. The drug was transported on fishing and pleasure boats from Morocco to selected locations in the area of Costa del Sol and the Strait of Gibraltar, where the smugglers handed the drugs over to couriers to be smuggled onshore and stored in several safe places with easy access from the sea.

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Figure 19. For smuggling hashish, most detections along the external borders were reported between Morocco and Spain on a wide variety of vehicles

Main routes and hubs of hashish smuggling to Spain in Q2 2013 and the most prevalent means of transportation used



Air routes are also used to smuggle narcotics from Morocco to Spain. On 23 April, an ultra light helicopter heading to Málaga and carrying 110 kg of hashish from Moroccan suppliers was intercepted during a joint operation of the Spanish police and Guardia Civil. This means of transport is relatively easy to obtain and its use is a way of avoiding the tight security controls at commercial airports.

#### Eastern borders

In Q2 2013, narcotic drugs were crossing the EU external eastern border from both

sides. Whereas most detected cases involved individuals trying to cross the border with small amounts meant mainly for personal consumption, border authorities estimate that Europe is not only a destination country for Afghan heroin, but also a major transit region of various types of narcotics smuggled eastwards. In several cases, criminals were caught while attempting to cross the EU eastern borders with cannabis originating from Morocco or cocaine originating from Latin America destined for the Russian Federation or other countries of Central Asia.



In late May 2013, Spanish authorities performed the Operation Albatros, resulting in the seizure of 3 400 kilos of cocaine and the arrest of 21 persons. The fishing boat, carrying a Senegalese flag, was intercepted in the Atlantic Ocean in the area between South America and the archipelago of Azores. The boat departed from Venezuela heading to Vigo (northwest Spain), mainly with Korean and Indonesian nationals onboard.

This organised network consisted of a supplier in Venezuela, a second group in Galicia (Spain), responsible for receiving the drug and the land distribution, and a third cell in charge of all logistical aspects of the operation to transport the drugs from the high seas to the coast in speedboats or fishing boats.

#### 4.10.4. Exit of stolen motor vehicles

##### Eastern Borders

Frontex Joint Operations reported a significant increase in the number of stolen vehicles detected at the EU's eastern borders in Q2 2013. A total of 132 stolen vehicles were prevented from crossing the border in Q2 2013, whereas 96 were detected in the same period of 2012 and only 53 in the first quarter of 2013. As in previous quarters, the largest number of cars were detected on exit from Poland to Ukraine (see Fig. 20), although only 52 vehicles were identified in Q2 2013, compared to 58 in the same period of 2012. Since 2012, the number of detections at the Polish-Belarusian and Slovakian-Ukrainian borders has been rather low but relatively stable.

The most commonly detected brand at the eastern border in Q2 2013 was Mercedes Benz, with 23 detections, followed by Volkswagen and BMW cars, which were prevented from leaving the EU in 15 and 13 cases, respectively. Audis and Fords were identified as stolen in seven incidents each. The single model most often smuggled across EU eastern borders was BMW X5, which was detected by border authorities in eight cases.

##### Western Balkans

The Joint Operation Focal Points Land reported the detection of 23 stolen vehicles at the EU's external borders to the Western Balkan countries. Most of the stolen cars were prevented from leaving the EU between Slovenia and Croatia. Nine stolen motor vehicles were stopped in attempts to enter Serbia.

##### Western Mediterranean and West African route

In Q2 2013, 17 incidents involving stolen vehicles were reported through Frontex Joint Operations in the Western Mediterranean Sea. As a result, 23 persons of Moroccan and other nationalities were caught during the attempted exit of these stolen vehicles, in many cases presenting forged car documents.


#### 4.10.5. Fuel smuggling

The smuggling of fuel from Libya to the EU has become a major issue for law-enforcement authorities in the central Mediterranean Sea. At the beginning of April, a Libyan patrol boat stopped a Panamanian-registered ship called *Levante* on its way to Malta, which was loaded with contraband fuel. After the vessel was ordered to return to Tripoli, seven Egyptians and one Maltese national were arrested. The crew members admitted that they had already made four trips in



Figure 20. **Most stolen cars were detected on exit at the Polish and Lithuanian borders to Belarus and Ukraine**

Stolen vehicles detected in Q2 2013 on exit along the EU eastern borders





which they illegally imported fuel to Malta. According to Libyan media sources, the 400 tonnes of diesel on the ship cost around EUR 36 000 in Libya, whereas Maltese consumers would have to pay around EUR 620 000 for the same amount.

At the beginning of July, the Armed Forces of Malta foiled another attempt to smuggle fuel from Libya. A Maltese maritime patrol aircraft detected the vessel *MV Alice* transferring Libyan fuel to four Maltese vessels on the high seas. After being ordered to enter the port in Valletta, the authorities established that the *MV Alice* had 80 000 litres of contraband fuel onboard. Large amounts of the fuel were spilled into the sea during the ship to ship transfers, thus creating damage to the environment. The law-enforcement operation eventually led to the arrest of 28 persons of Maltese, Indonesian and Egyptian nationality.

#### 4.10.6. Terrorism

On 21 June, the Spanish police arrested eight people accused of funding and facilitating the travel of potential foreign fighters to Syria. The Spanish citizens operated from the Spanish enclave of Ceuta and the Moroccan city of Fnideq. According to a statement made by the Spanish Ministry of Interior, the al-Qaeda-linked group managed to recruit dozens of persons from Spain and Morocco and arranged their travel via Turkey to Syria, where they were allegedly trained and involved in insurgent warfare and terrorist attacks.

The participation of Europeans in rebel activities in Syria is of major concern for police authorities and intelligence agencies in the EU. In an interview with the BBC given on 24 April 2013, the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove warned that around 500 EU nationals were already fighting with the insurgents. German law-enforcement authorities recently reported that



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Figure 21. In April 2013, EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, warned that around 500 persons from EU countries are already fighting with the insurgents

around 120 Germans joined the insurgency. Authorities are striving to prevent potential fighters from leaving the country and managed to convince around a dozen of them to stay. A small number of German fighters are known to have already returned to Germany, others have died in combat. One German national in Syria has recently called for suicide attacks against civilians in his internet video post. Although authorities are apparently not aware of any specific plans of returning foreign fighters to conduct attacks within the EU, both their potential radicalisation and weapons and explosives training could make them a substantial threat in their home country.

#### Turkey thwarts Belgians' attempt to join the fighting in Syria

Four Belgian citizens were returned to Belgium in June 2013 after they were arrested by the Turkish Army before trying to illegally enter Syria. Would-be foreign fighters probably entered Turkey legally via air or land routes and then infiltrated into Syria.

Another law-enforcement operation in Q2 2013 revealed connections between the global illicit drug trade and terrorism. The Spanish newspaper *El País* reported in April that an internationally coordinated police operation showed a certain extent of cooperation between alleged members of the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In March, two

Colombian nationals were arrested in Algeria along with three alleged members of AQIM. The Colombians, who later showed to be affiliated to the FARC, were about to deliver a shipment of cocaine. In exchange, they would receive cash and arms deriving from Libyan arsenals. According to the reports, the drugs were destined for the European market.



## 5. Statistical annex

### LEGEND

**Symbols and abbreviations:** **n.a.** not applicable  
: data not available

**Source:** FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 1 August 2013, unless otherwise indicated

**Note:** 'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including both 27 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries

Annex Table 1. **Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2012				2013 Q1	2013 Q2		per cent of total	
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		Q2	% change on year ago prev. qtr		
<b>All Borders</b>									
Kosovo*	203	199	272	316	588	<b>4 456</b>	2 139	658	18
Albania	1 177	1 797	1 254	1 423	1 199	<b>3 098</b>	72	158	12
Syria	715	2 024	3 923	1 241	1 248	<b>2 784</b>	38	123	11
Pakistan	1 045	1 650	1 491	691	755	<b>1 990</b>	21	164	8.0
Eritrea	270	461	575	1 298	123	<b>1 948</b>	323	1 484	7.9
Afghanistan	2 153	4 529	4 518	1 969	1 082	<b>1 892</b>	-58	75	7.6
Somalia	1 017	1 673	1 283	1 065	481	<b>1 466</b>	-12	205	5.9
Algeria	1 275	2 000	1 494	710	622	<b>998</b>	-50	60	4.0
Egypt	246	626	458	152	243	<b>818</b>	31	237	3.3
Not specified	321	525	771	496	655	<b>673</b>	28	2.7	2.7
Others	5 214	7 611	6 054	4 252	2 721	<b>4 682</b>	-38	72	19
<b>Total All Borders</b>	<b>13 636</b>	<b>23 095</b>	<b>22 093</b>	<b>13 613</b>	<b>9 717</b>	<b>24 805</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Land Borders</b>									
Kosovo*	203	199	272	316	588	<b>4 449</b>	2 136	657	31
Albania	1 176	1 736	1 214	1 334	1 158	<b>3 042</b>	75	163	21
Pakistan	915	1 189	1 006	234	403	<b>1 512</b>	27	275	10
Syria	676	1 918	3 321	501	591	<b>960</b>	-50	62	6.6
Algeria	1 227	1 481	878	495	505	<b>794</b>	-46	57	5.4
Not specified	307	463	554	493	643	<b>664</b>	43	3.3	4.6
Afghanistan	1 775	3 963	3 584	516	473	<b>498</b>	-87	5.3	3.4
Morocco	425	570	227	200	150	<b>259</b>	-55	73	1.8
Bangladesh	1 392	2 348	959	52	46	<b>221</b>	-91	380	1.5
Palestine	267	363	309	256	121	<b>177</b>	-51	46	1.2
Others	2 840	3 575	2 237	1 217	1 338	<b>2 006</b>	-44	50	14
<b>Total Land Border</b>	<b>11 203</b>	<b>17 805</b>	<b>14 561</b>	<b>5 614</b>	<b>6 016</b>	<b>14 582</b>	<b>-18</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Sea Borders</b>									
Eritrea	39	223	434	1 246	10	<b>1 891</b>	748	18 810	18
Syria	39	106	602	740	657	<b>1 824</b>	1 621	178	18
Afghanistan	378	566	934	1 453	609	<b>1 394</b>	146	129	14
Somalia	553	1 106	862	959	364	<b>1 336</b>	21	267	13
Egypt	186	533	422	142	226	<b>775</b>	45	243	7.6
Pakistan	130	461	485	457	352	<b>478</b>	3.7	36	4.7
Mali	4	22	100	296	150	<b>471</b>	2 041	214	4.6
Gambia	21	36	153	304	251	<b>333</b>	825	33	3.3
Algeria	48	519	616	215	117	<b>204</b>	-61	74	2.0
Tunisia	357	685	1 008	233	79	<b>194</b>	-72	146	1.9
Others	678	1 033	1 916	1 954	886	<b>1 323</b>	28	49	13
<b>Total Sea Border</b>	<b>2 433</b>	<b>5 290</b>	<b>7 532</b>	<b>7 999</b>	<b>3 701</b>	<b>10 223</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>100</b>

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Annex Table 2. **Clandestine entries at BCPs**

Detections at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2012				2013	2013 Q2		per cent of total	
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago		prev. qtr
<b>Border Type</b>									
Land	67	106	151	160	117	<b>105</b>	-0.9	-10	89
Sea	36	20	16	43	13	<b>13</b>	-35	0	11
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Afghanistan	50	52	47	41	33	<b>29</b>	-44	-12	25
Syria	1	4	9	28	24	<b>15</b>	275	-38	13
Algeria	8	10	15	28	12	<b>13</b>	30	8.3	11
Kosovo*	4	6	2	0	7	<b>9</b>	50	29	7.6
Pakistan	0	11	1	12	3	<b>8</b>	-27	167	6.8
Iraq	4	3	5	2	2	<b>8</b>	167	300	6.8
Ghana	0	1	0	4	5	<b>7</b>	600	40	5.9
Morocco	3	10	7	4	8	<b>5</b>	-50	-38	4.2
Croatia	0	1	8	2	4	<b>4</b>	300	0	3.4
Serbia	4	10	6	3	2	<b>3</b>	-70	50	2.5
Others	29	18	67	79	30	<b>17</b>	-5.6	-43	14
<b>Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>203</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>-6.3</b>	<b>-9.2</b>	<b>100</b>

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

### Annex Table 3. Facilitators

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2012				2013	2013 Q2			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
<b>Place of Detection</b>									
Inland	1 489	1 254	1 019	1 424	1 142	<b>1 199</b>	-4.4	5.0	70
Land	215	177	272	223	186	<b>168</b>	-5.1	-9.7	9.9
Sea	129	116	117	109	98	<b>105</b>	-9.5	7.1	6.2
Land Intra EU	138	122	96	142	93	<b>104</b>	-15	12	6.1
Air	81	70	97	110	80	<b>65</b>	-7.1	-19	3.8
Not specified	53	46	111	110	23	<b>64</b>	39	178	3.8
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Italy	202	94	98	149	112	177	88	58	10
Not specified	88	77	146	168	156	141	83	-9.6	8.3
China	88	101	61	66	59	103	2.0	75	6.0
Morocco	90	95	91	185	77	79	-17	2.6	4.6
Albania	73	37	65	68	60	72	95	20	4.2
Poland	48	41	53	23	26	68	66	162	4.0
France	95	99	70	88	81	61	-38	-25	3.6
Bulgaria	40	29	37	53	37	60	107	62	3.5
Spain	140	144	77	137	70	58	-60	-17	3.4
Pakistan	59	82	62	83	48	49	-40	2.1	2.9
Others	1 182	986	952	1 098	896	837	-15	-6.6	4.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>2 105</b>	<b>1 785</b>	<b>1 712</b>	<b>2 118</b>	<b>1 622</b>	<b>1 705</b>	<b>-4.5</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>100</b>

### Annex Table 4. Illegal stay

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2012				2013	2013 Q2			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
<b>Place of Detection</b>									
Inland*	72 520	68 906	68 696	68 316	64 071	<b>67 975</b>	-1.4	6.1	85
Air	8 693	8 493	9 752	8 472	7 779	<b>7 179</b>	-15	-7.7	9.0
Land	4 731	4 766	5 632	4 754	4 117	<b>3 721</b>	-22	-9.6	4.6
Land Intra EU	1 347	1 427	1 393	1 665	377	<b>554</b>	-61	47	0.7
Sea	1 040	1 084	1 090	1 371	380	<b>461</b>	-57	21	0.6
Between BCP	130	212	187	195	166	<b>193</b>	-9.0	16	0.2
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Morocco	6 047	5 683	4 724	4 814	4 933	<b>5 294</b>	-6.8	7.3	6.6
Russian Federation	2 363	2 419	3 531	3 173	3 189	<b>4 150</b>	72	30	5.2
Not specified	1 159	1 253	2 653	4 142	3 985	<b>4 146</b>	231	4.0	5.2
Pakistan	3 752	5 088	4 989	4 505	3 779	<b>4 092</b>	-20	8.3	5.1
Afghanistan	6 345	6 179	6 252	5 619	4 077	<b>4 058</b>	-34	-0.5	5.1
Albania	3 167	3 627	2 856	3 614	3 388	<b>3 949</b>	8.9	17	4.9
Algeria	4 247	4 077	3 747	3 705	3 445	<b>3 726</b>	-8.6	8.2	4.7
Syria	1 396	2 020	4 004	4 547	3 848	<b>3 616</b>	79	-6.0	4.5
Tunisia	4 705	4 442	3 239	2 825	2 818	<b>2 934</b>	-34	4.1	3.7
Ukraine	3 202	3 036	3 655	3 188	2 867	<b>2 853</b>	-6.0	-0.5	3.6
Others	52 078	47 067	47 109	44 685	40 798	<b>41 286</b>	-12	1.2	5.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>88 461</b>	<b>84 891</b>	<b>86 759</b>	<b>84 817</b>	<b>77 127</b>	<b>80 104</b>	<b>-5.6</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>100</b>

\* For the Netherlands, detections of illegal stay inland in 2012 and Q1 2013 are not available at this moment.



Annex Table 5. **Refusals of entry**

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2012				2013		2013 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	
<b>All Borders</b>									
Russian Federation	1 945	2 325	2 978	2 864	2 597	<b>6 977</b>	200	169	21
Ukraine	3 788	3 994	5 840	4 484	3 745	<b>4 299</b>	7.6	15	13
Albania	2 261	3 737	2 837	3 201	2 781	<b>2 688</b>	-28	-3.3	8.1
Georgia	568	1 692	3 282	3 304	1 578	<b>2 456</b>	45	56	7.4
Serbia	1 389	1 222	1 487	1 542	1 991	<b>1 613</b>	32	-19	4.9
Belarus	1 106	1 116	1 386	1 425	1 105	<b>1 230</b>	10	11	3.7
Morocco	1 058	1 081	708	1 087	1 290	<b>1 052</b>	-2.7	-18	3.2
Croatia	1 032	1 048	977	792	1 197	<b>882</b>	-16	-26	2.7
Brazil	1 012	859	563	608	734	<b>629</b>	-27	-14	1.9
United States	475	509	569	508	503	<b>609</b>	20	21	1.8
Others	10 192	10 654	11 366	11 221	10 390	<b>10 781</b>	1.2	3.8	32
<b>Total All Borders</b>	<b>24 826</b>	<b>28 237</b>	<b>31 993</b>	<b>31 036</b>	<b>27 911</b>	<b>33 216</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Land Borders</b>									
Russian Federation	1 290	1 620	2 185	2 211	1 953	<b>6 370</b>	293	226	31
Ukraine	3 503	3 723	5 500	4 281	3 535	<b>4 041</b>	8.5	14	20
Georgia	493	1 620	3 214	3 208	1 498	<b>2 363</b>	46	58	12
Albania	1 192	2 587	1 684	1 915	1 576	<b>1 474</b>	-43	-6.5	7.2
Serbia	1 200	1 034	1 265	1 311	1 769	<b>1 429</b>	38	-19	7.0
Belarus	1 080	1 086	1 350	1 396	1 080	<b>1 209</b>	11	12	5.9
Croatia	979	1 002	925	728	1 142	<b>847</b>	-15	-26	4.1
Morocco	666	708	295	747	943	<b>706</b>	-0.3	-25	3.5
ŷYROM	400	506	472	403	441	<b>470</b>	-7.1	6.6	2.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	347	346	385	454	615	<b>373</b>	7.8	-39	1.8
Others	920	1 021	2 024	1 507	1 046	<b>1 143</b>	12	9.3	5.6
<b>Total Land Border</b>	<b>12 070</b>	<b>15 253</b>	<b>19 299</b>	<b>18 161</b>	<b>15 598</b>	<b>20 425</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Air Borders</b>									
Albania	617	638	581	853	724	<b>747</b>	17	3.2	6.7
Brazil	1 003	841	540	596	724	<b>615</b>	-27	-15	5.5
United States	461	484	534	487	492	<b>590</b>	22	20	5.3
Algeria	269	356	299	406	430	<b>565</b>	59	31	5.0
Not specified	435	458	453	612	512	<b>466</b>	1.7	-9.0	4.2
Russian Federation	373	389	510	378	401	<b>393</b>	1.0	-2.0	3.5
China	305	258	345	287	268	<b>382</b>	48	43	3.4
Nigeria	374	435	477	423	340	<b>380</b>	-13	12	3.4
Turkey	355	352	322	393	336	<b>272</b>	-23	-19	2.4
India	203	286	231	232	165	<b>262</b>	-8.4	59	2.3
Others	6 828	6 368	6 349	6 667	6 409	<b>6 524</b>	2.4	1.8	58
<b>Total Air Border</b>	<b>11 223</b>	<b>10 865</b>	<b>10 641</b>	<b>11 334</b>	<b>10 801</b>	<b>11 196</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Sea Borders</b>									
Albania	452	512	572	433	481	<b>467</b>	-8.8	-2.9	29
Philippines	208	371	241	252	251	<b>275</b>	-26	9.6	17
Russian Federation	282	316	283	275	243	<b>214</b>	-32	-12	13
Morocco	138	114	168	101	99	<b>129</b>	13	30	8.1
India	26	89	51	92	34	<b>71</b>	-20	109	4.5
Not specified	40	117	43	51	29	<b>47</b>	-60	62	2.9
Tunisia	28	26	39	35	36	<b>39</b>	50	8.3	2.4
Syria	7	56	55	11	11	<b>36</b>	-36	227	2.3
Turkey	18	30	65	26	29	<b>36</b>	20	24	2.3
Serbia	33	33	42	26	19	<b>28</b>	-15	47	1.8
Others	301	455	494	239	280	<b>253</b>	-44	-9.6	16
<b>Total Sea Border</b>	<b>1 533</b>	<b>2 119</b>	<b>2 053</b>	<b>1 541</b>	<b>1 512</b>	<b>1 595</b>	<b>-25</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>100</b>



## Annex Table 6. Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by reasons for refusal and top ten nationalities

	Refused persons Total	2013 Q2 – Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below)										Total Reasons
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	n.a.	
<b>Top Ten nationalities</b>												
Russian Federation	6 977	177	3	6 032	22	273	6	202	177	82	36	<b>7 010</b>
Ukraine	4 299	10	29	1 604	9	1 972	30	420	179	16	40	<b>4 309</b>
Albania	2 688	226	49	138	4	550	80	385	1 101	62	115	<b>2 710</b>
Georgia	2 456	0	2	2 344	0	43	1	13	52	5	8	<b>2 468</b>
Serbia	1 613	26	4	98	1	344	218	415	469	31	9	<b>1 615</b>
Belarus	1 230	2	0	531	2	357	11	219	67	47	8	<b>1 244</b>
Morocco	1 052	769	43	168	15	133	6	104	128	105	10	<b>1 481</b>
Croatia	882	247	1	6	0	47	185	68	131	183	16	<b>884</b>
Brazil	629	5	10	53	0	205	38	43	95	11	242	<b>702</b>
United States	609	25	0	5	0	12	21	6	9	5	528	<b>611</b>
Others	10 781	826	508	2 912	251	2 810	280	708	561	287	2 022	<b>11 165</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>33 216</b>	<b>2 313</b>	<b>649</b>	<b>13 891</b>	<b>304</b>	<b>6 746</b>	<b>876</b>	<b>2 583</b>	<b>2 969</b>	<b>834</b>	<b>3 034</b>	<b>34 199</b>

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:

**A** has no valid travel document(s);

**B** has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;

**C** has no valid visa or residence permit;

**D** has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;

**E** has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;

**F** has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the EU;

**G** does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;

**H** is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;

**I** is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the EU.



Annex Table 7. **Refusals of entry**

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by border type and reasons for refusal

	2012				2013		2013 Q2		per cent of total	Highest share
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr		
<b>All Borders</b>										
										<b>Nationality</b>
C) No valid visa	6 033	8 313	11 381	10 202	7 799	13 891	67	78	41	Russian Fed. (43%)
E) No justification	6 109	5 704	6 728	6 765	6 357	6 746	18	6.1	20	Ukraine (29%)
Reason not available	2 540	2 693	3 031	2 863	2 655	3 034	13	14	8.9	United States (17%)
H) Alert issued	3 354	3 281	5 099	3 961	3 413	2 969	-9.5	-13	8.7	Albania (37%)
G) No subsistence	2 507	3 400	2 651	2 457	2 804	2 583	-24	-7.9	7.6	Ukraine (16%)
A) No valid document	1 863	1 998	2 021	1 961	2 095	2 313	16	10	6.8	Morocco (33%)
F) Over 3 month stay	1 479	1 142	1 531	1 212	1 210	876	-23	-28	2.6	Serbia (25%)
I) Threat	762	816	886	806	999	834	2.2	-17	2.4	Croatia (22%)
B) False document	913	1 004	798	1 049	675	649	-35	-3.9	1.9	Unknown (14%)
D) False visa	380	374	511	572	356	304	-19	-15	0.9	Russian Fed. (7.2%)
<b>Total All Borders</b>	<b>25 940</b>	<b>28 725</b>	<b>34 637</b>	<b>31 848</b>	<b>28 363</b>	<b>34 199</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>Land Borders</b>										
										<b>Nationality</b>
C) No valid visa	3 646	5 521	8 389	7 498	5 474	11 251	104	106	54	Russian Fed. (51%)
E) No justification	2 185	2 259	3 875	3 530	2 810	3 256	44	16	16	Ukraine (58%)
H) Alert issued	2 167	2 183	3 996	2 912	2 439	2 094	-4.1	-14	10	Albania (32%)
G) No subsistence	1 725	2 484	1 750	1 527	1 938	1 661	-33	-14	8.0	Ukraine (24%)
A) No valid document	912	896	906	784	1 043	1 303	45	25	6.2	Morocco (56%)
F) Over 3 month stay	1 221	925	1 336	1 036	975	682	-26	-30	3.3	Serbia (31%)
I) Threat	475	529	609	460	706	486	-8.1	-31	2.3	Croatia (38%)
B) False document	310	464	328	305	100	111	-76	11	0.5	Albania (38%)
D) False visa	81	110	192	257	81	38	-65	-53	0.2	Russian Fed. (34%)
Reason not available	0	0	0	0	101	0	n.a.	n.a.	0	
<b>Total Land Border</b>	<b>12 722</b>	<b>15 371</b>	<b>21 381</b>	<b>18 309</b>	<b>15 667</b>	<b>20 882</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>Air Borders</b>										
										<b>Nationality</b>
E) No justification	3 815	3 317	2 590	3 085	3 352	3 229	-2.7	-3.7	28	Algeria (9.4%)
Reason not available	2 466	2 568	2 901	2 778	2 461	2 903	13	18	25	United States (18%)
C) No valid visa	1 991	2 050	2 389	2 221	1 913	2 141	4.4	12	19	Russian Fed. (9.1%)
G) No subsistence	731	822	852	892	807	858	4.4	6.3	7.4	Albania (9.3%)
A) No valid document	600	589	629	794	708	647	9.8	-8.6	5.6	Unknown (38%)
H) Alert issued	721	644	634	698	638	561	-13	-12	4.9	Albania (36%)
B) False document	568	518	441	712	562	455	-12	-19	3.9	Unknown (15%)
I) Threat	276	267	259	319	260	306	15	18	2.7	Suriname (14%)
D) False visa	277	246	295	308	259	250	1.6	-3.5	2.2	Côte d'Ivoire (6.4%)
F) Over 3 month stay	257	213	191	173	223	187	-12	-16	1.6	Brazil (18%)
<b>Total Air Border</b>	<b>11 702</b>	<b>11 234</b>	<b>11 181</b>	<b>11 980</b>	<b>11 183</b>	<b>11 537</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>Sea Borders</b>										
										<b>Nationality</b>
C) No valid visa	396	742	603	483	412	483	-35	17	30	Philippines (46%)
A) No valid document	351	513	486	383	344	359	-30	4.4	23	Russian Fed. (45%)
H) Alert issued	466	454	469	351	336	291	-36	-13	18	Albania (81%)
E) No justification	109	128	263	150	195	197	54	1.0	12	Albania (58%)
Reason not available	74	125	130	85	93	128	2.4	38	8.0	Afghanistan (13%)
G) No subsistence	51	94	49	38	59	64	-32	8.5	4.0	Albania (94%)
I) Threat	11	20	18	27	33	42	110	27	2.6	Albania (86%)
B) False document	35	22	29	32	13	13	-41	0	0.8	Unknown (38%)
D) False visa	22	18	24	7	16	11	-39	-31	0.7	Morocco (82%)
F) Over 3 month stay	1	4	4	3	12	7	75	-42	0.4	Turkey (57%)
<b>Total Sea Border</b>	<b>1 516</b>	<b>2 120</b>	<b>2 075</b>	<b>1 559</b>	<b>1 513</b>	<b>1 595</b>	<b>-25</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>100</b>	

### Annex Table 8. Applications for asylum

Applications for international protection reported by top ten nationalities

	2012				2013	2013 Q2			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Russian Federation	2 697	2 993	4 660	6 414	7 010	<b>15 453</b>	416	120	18
Syria	2 447	3 591	7 595	9 146	8 375	<b>7 917</b>	120	-5.5	9.3
Kosovo*	906	1 045	1 027	1 642	1 912	<b>6 487</b>	521	239	7.6
Afghanistan	6 306	6 881	7 343	7 652	5 791	<b>5 458</b>	-21	-5.8	6.4
Pakistan	3 126	3 539	3 964	4 783	3 422	<b>4 840</b>	37	41	5.7
Somalia	2 820	4 073	3 742	4 152	3 460	<b>4 046</b>	-0.7	17	4.7
Iran	2 488	2 769	3 470	3 894	3 019	<b>2 891</b>	4.4	-4.2	3.4
Not specified	3 881	2 295	3 127	5 540	3 758	<b>2 728</b>	19	-27	3.2
Nigeria	1 773	1 913	2 005	2 194	2 452	<b>2 478</b>	30	1.1	2.9
Serbia	3 352	1 691	4 576	6 321	2 465	<b>2 258</b>	34	-8.4	2.6
Others	27 061	28 786	32 212	34 420	31 200	<b>30 806</b>	7.0	-1.3	36
<b>Total</b>	<b>56 857</b>	<b>59 576</b>	<b>73 721</b>	<b>86 158</b>	<b>72 864</b>	<b>85 362</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>100</b>

For the Netherlands, due to modifications of the national information system, the breakdown by nationality of inland asylum applications is not available from the reporting period January 2012 to April 2012.

For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications.

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Annex Table 9. **Document fraud**

False documents detected at BCPs reported by border type and top ten nationalities

Border Type	2012				2013		2013 Q2		per cent of total	Highest share Nationality Claimed
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr		
Air	1 241	1 207	1 222	1 822	2 168	<b>2 030</b>	68	-6.4	78	Unknown (18%)
Land	740	1 060	819	654	574	<b>464</b>	-56	-19	18	Albania (41%)
Sea	103	98	134	84	68	<b>119</b>	21	75	4.6	Morocco (75%)
Not specified	0	1	0	4	0	<b>2</b>	100	n.a.	0.1	Iran
<b>Top Ten Nationalities Claimed</b>										<b>Nationality Document</b>
Syria	31	60	92	412	406	<b>378</b>	530	-6.9	14	Greece (20%)
Unknown	78	58	37	76	360	<b>378</b>	552	5.0	14	France (16%)
Albania	353	909	498	391	325	<b>263</b>	-71	-19	10	Greece (72%)
Morocco	197	82	56	115	89	<b>141</b>	72	58	5.4	Spain (35%)
Iran	79	68	80	64	119	<b>94</b>	38	-21	3.6	Germany (24%)
Nigeria	109	75	58	74	87	<b>79</b>	5.3	-9.2	3.0	Nigeria (27%)
Ukraine	151	72	75	55	50	<b>71</b>	-1.4	42	2.7	Poland (52%)
Senegal	26	27	26	28	48	<b>66</b>	144	38	2.5	Senegal (50%)
Bangladesh	21	50	62	108	86	<b>62</b>	24	-28	2.4	Italy (55%)
Pakistan	64	94	44	75	35	<b>61</b>	-35	74	2.3	Greece (38%)
Others	975	871	1 147	1 166	1 205	<b>1 022</b>	17	-15	39	France (15%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>2 084</b>	<b>2 366</b>	<b>2 175</b>	<b>2 564</b>	<b>2 810</b>	<b>2 615</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>-6.9</b>	<b>100</b>	

Annex Table 10. Document fraud

False documents detected at BCPs reported by type of document and type of fraud

Document Type	2012				2013		2013 Q2		per cent of total	Highest share
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr		
<b>PASSPORTS</b>	<b>706</b>	<b>647</b>	<b>768</b>	<b>1 050</b>	<b>1 261</b>	<b>1 283</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>France (9.7%)</b>
Forged	269	288	327	456	447	521	81	17	41	Turkey (6.5%)
Authentic	192	151	241	270	480	421	179	-12	33	France (16%)
Counterfeit	98	99	74	179	149	176	78	18	14	Turkey (24%)
No more details	133	98	108	75	150	139	42	-7.3	11	France (13%)
Stolen blank	14	11	18	69	32	24	118	-25	1.9	Germany (92%)
Pseudo	0	0	0	1	3	2	n.a.	-33	0	Argentina (50%)
<b>ID CARDS</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>247</b>	<b>217</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>290</b>	<b>275</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>-5.2</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>Italy (24%)</b>
Counterfeit	131	112	102	134	148	139	24	-6.1	51	Italy (24%)
Authentic	71	47	52	47	67	73	55	9	27	Spain (36%)
Forged	11	44	13	37	25	47	6.8	88	17	Italy (45%)
Stolen blank	12	18	7	13	25	10	-44	-60	3.6	Italy (70%)
No more details	12	25	42	11	22	6	-76	-73	2.2	Belgium (67%)
Pseudo	1	1	1	0	3	0	-100	-100	0	
<b>VISA</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>170</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>318</b>	<b>259</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>-19</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>France (24%)</b>
Counterfeit	118	95	83	111	189	144	52	-24	56	France (26%)
Forged	28	22	41	79	61	58	164	-4.9	22	Italy (53%)
No more details	17	27	23	17	27	30	11	11	12	France (43%)
Authentic	8	10	13	13	25	21	110	-16	8.1	Italy (24%)
Stolen blank	11	16	7	22	16	6	-63	-63	2.3	Greece (33%)
Pseudo	1	0	0	0	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	0	
<b>RESIDENCE PERMITS</b>	<b>345</b>	<b>308</b>	<b>330</b>	<b>387</b>	<b>461</b>	<b>385</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>-16</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>Greece (32%)</b>
Counterfeit	172	142	161	159	154	122	-14	-21	32	Italy (31%)
Authentic	71	49	67	66	111	95	94	-14	25	France (37%)
Stolen blank	59	67	56	98	124	85	27	-31	22	Greece (68%)
Forged	27	34	25	50	45	54	59	20	14	Greece (65%)
No more details	16	15	21	14	26	28	87	7.7	7.3	Germany (43%)
Pseudo	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	Luxembourg (100%)
<b>STAMPS</b>	<b>577</b>	<b>959</b>	<b>630</b>	<b>509</b>	<b>409</b>	<b>350</b>	<b>-64</b>	<b>-14</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>Greece (58%)</b>
Counterfeit	502	931	583	470	366	315	-66	-14	90	Greece (63%)
Forged	0	27	42	35	34	32	19	-5.9	9.1	Hungary (25%)
No more details	75	1	5	4	9	3	200	-67	0.9	Italy (67%)
<b>OTHER</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>-11</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>Italy (37%)</b>
Counterfeit	16	17	47	101	39	36	112	-7.7	57	Italy (36%)
Authentic	9	9	12	23	23	10	11	-57	16	Italy (80%)
Forged	2	5	3	7	4	8	60	100	13	Sweden (25%)
Pseudo	2	3	0	3	4	7	133	75	11	Maldives (71%)
No more details	0	1	1	0	1	2	100	100	3.2	Italy (50%)
Stolen blank	6	0	0	0	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	0	
<b>Total</b>	<b>2 084</b>	<b>2 366</b>	<b>2 175</b>	<b>2 564</b>	<b>2 810</b>	<b>2 615</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>-6.9</b>		

In Greece, the discontinuity between 2011 and 2012 is due to the introduction of reporting of counterfeit stamps used by Albanian nationals at the land border between Greece and Albania.

Spain data include detections on entry, exit and transit.

2012 Q1 data for Sweden only include fraudulent documents detected in March.

Due to reporting and comparability issues data from France have been excluded from this table in 2012.



Annex Table 11A. Document fraud

Top ten combinations of nationality of document and document fraud by document type

Document Type	2012				2013		2013 Q2		per cent of total	Highest share
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	% change on prev. qtr		
<b>PASSPORTS</b>	<b>706</b>	<b>647</b>	<b>768</b>	<b>1 050</b>	<b>1 261</b>	<b>1 283</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>Unknown (21%)</b>
FRA-Authentic	20	13	27	33	55	68	423	24	5.3	Unknown (37%)
SWE-Authentic	6	10	16	44	78	55	450	-29	4.3	Syria (60%)
TUR-Counterfeit	7	9	14	56	38	42	367	11	3.3	Unknown (74%)
TUR-Forged	13	8	8	16	16	34	325	113	2.7	Unknown (50%)
FRA-Forged	5	23	17	20	26	33	43	27	2.6	Unknown (15%)
SWE-Forged	3	2	5	4	7	31	1450	343	2.4	Syria (45%)
SEN-Forged	5	4	0	10	15	27	575	80	2.1	Senegal (52%)
GBR-Forged	12	25	23	34	21	24	-4	14	1.9	Afghanistan (46%)
MLI-Authentic	6	7	6	17	31	24	243	-23	1.9	Mali (63%)
SYR-Forged	3	6	6	18	16	22	267	38	1.7	Syria
Others	626	540	646	798	958	923	71	-3.7	72	Unknown (17%)
<b>ID CARDS</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>247</b>	<b>217</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>290</b>	<b>275</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>-5.2</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>Albania (19%)</b>
ITA-Counterfeit	42	46	19	21	51	33	-28	-35	12	Albania (39%)
ESP-Authentic	41	20	16	19	12	26	30	117	9.5	Morocco (73%)
ITA-Forged	3	9	3	15	11	21	133	91	7.6	Albania (86%)
BGR-Counterfeit	6	7	8	11	12	19	171	58	6.9	Syria (37%)
BEL-Counterfeit	6	5	14	4	5	18	260	260	6.5	Morocco (44%)
FRA-Authentic	5	4	10	6	19	15	275	-21	5.5	Unknown (53%)
ROU-Counterfeit	18	12	13	7	11	14	17	27	5.1	Albania (36%)
TUR-Counterfeit	2	2	4	47	20	10	400	-50	3.6	Unknown (50%)
GRC-Counterfeit	9	16	10	2	15	10	-38	-33	3.6	Unknown (40%)
BEL-Authentic	1	3	7	2	8	7	133	-13	2.5	Senegal (14%)
Others	105	123	113	108	126	102	-17	-19	37	Syria (22%)
<b>VISA</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>170</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>318</b>	<b>259</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>-19</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>Unknown (10%)</b>
FRA-Counterfeit	40	44	27	24	34	37	-16	8.8	14	Afghanistan (16%)
ITA-Forged	7	10	23	46	30	31	210	3.3	12	Bangladesh (48%)
DEU-Counterfeit	17	14	22	27	36	26	86	-28	10	Iran (38%)
BEL-Counterfeit	1	0	1	12	21	14	n.a.	-33	5.4	Nigeria (29%)
FRA-No more details	10	8	3	9	7	13	63	86	5.0	Senegal (31%)
ESP-Counterfeit	14	3	9	9	32	12	300	-63	4.6	Nigeria (25%)
ITA-Counterfeit	19	9	5	8	10	11	22	10	4.2	Sri Lanka (64%)
AUT-Counterfeit	0	3	0	8	8	9	200	13	3.5	Nigeria (89%)
FRA-Forged	8	5	3	7	16	8	60	-50	3.1	Unknown (38%)
ESP-Forged	1	2	0	3	2	7	250	250	2.7	Dominican Republic (29%)
Others	66	72	74	89	122	91	26	-25	35	Unknown (21%)

Total: see Table 11B

In Greece, the discontinuity between 2011 and 2012 is due to the introduction of reporting of counterfeit stamps used by Albanian nationals at the land border between Greece and Albania.

Spain data include detections on entry, exit and transit.

2012 Q1 data for Sweden only include fraudulent documents detected in March.

Due to reporting and comparability issues data from France have been excluded from this table in 2012. Due to reporting and comparability issues data from France have been excluded from this table.

Annex Table 11B. Document fraud

Top ten combinations of nationality of document and document fraud by document type

Document Type	2012				2013		2013 Q2		per cent of total	Highest share
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr		
<b>RESIDENCE PERMITS</b>	<b>345</b>	<b>308</b>	<b>330</b>	<b>387</b>	<b>461</b>	<b>385</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>-16</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>Syria (16%)</b>
GRC-Stolen blank	21	47	33	58	57	58	23	1.8	15	Syria (47%)
ITA-Counterfeit	47	63	46	29	37	38	-40	2.7	10	Morocco (21%)
FRA-Authentic	9	9	20	22	34	35	289	2.9	9.1	Unknown (29%)
GRC-Forged	9	17	14	33	17	35	106	106	9.1	Pakistan (43%)
ESP-Counterfeit	27	14	9	14	16	28	100	75	7.3	Dominican Republic (25%)
DEU-Stolen blank	24	18	17	36	60	24	33	-60	6.2	Iran (33%)
ESP-Authentic	33	21	20	18	28	23	9.5	-18	6.0	Morocco (43%)
GRC-Counterfeit	9	5	7	32	14	18	260	29	4.7	Syria (67%)
BEL-Counterfeit	21	20	23	25	23	14	-30	-39	3.6	Morocco (21%)
DEU-No more details	7	1	9	1	6	12	1100	100	3.1	Côte d'Ivoire (42%)
Others	138	93	132	119	169	100	7.5	-41	26	Unknown (17%)
<b>STAMPS</b>	<b>577</b>	<b>959</b>	<b>630</b>	<b>509</b>	<b>409</b>	<b>350</b>	<b>-64</b>	<b>-14</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>Albania (52%)</b>
GRC-Counterfeit	254	646	405	352	251	200	-69	-20	5.7	Albania (87%)
POL-Counterfeit	78	34	29	27	15	30	-12	100	8.6	Ukraine (93%)
FRA-Counterfeit	20	2	8	13	9	14	600	56	4.0	China (21%)
DEU-Counterfeit	5	8	10	11	21	13	63	-38	3.7	Kosovo* (23%)
ITA-Counterfeit	9	12	16	5	11	10	-17	-9.1	2.9	Albania (30%)
HUN-Counterfeit	9	5	12	5	10	9	80	-10	2.6	Ukraine (56%)
HUN-Forged	0	2	9	3	7	8	300	14	2.3	Albania (25%)
TUR-Counterfeit	0	2	1	10	2	7	250	250	2.0	Syria (57%)
ESP-Counterfeit	6	5	5	4	8	6	20	-25	1.7	Gambia (33%)
BEL-Counterfeit	3	2	1	3	5	5	150	0	1.4	Angola (40%)
Others	193	241	134	76	70	48	-80	-31	14	Ukraine (21%)
<b>Other</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>-11</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>Romania (27%)</b>
ITA-Counterfeit	2	7	12	78	16	13	86	-19	21	Bangladesh (31%)
ITA-Authentic	5	5	7	19	15	8	60	-47	13	Bangladesh (88%)
BGR-Counterfeit	1	0	0	3	7	7	n.a.	0	11	Romania
MDV-Pseudo	0	0	0	0	1	5	n.a.	400	7.9	Maldives (40%)
FRA-Counterfeit	2	0	0	2	2	3	n.a.	50	4.8	Romania
SVN-Counterfeit	0	0	0	0	1	2	n.a.	100	3.2	Slovenia (50%)
UNK-Pseudo	1	0	0	2	3	2	n.a.	-33	3.2	Ukraine
DEU-Counterfeit	0	0	0	1	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	3.2	Turkey (50%)
ESP-Counterfeit	0	0	0	1	1	2	n.a.	100	3.2	Romania
SWE-Forged	0	0	0	1	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	3.2	Iraq (50%)
Others	24	23	44	27	25	17	-26	-32	27	Unknown (18%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>2 084</b>	<b>2 366</b>	<b>2 175</b>	<b>2 564</b>	<b>2 810</b>	<b>2 615</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>-6.9</b>	<b>100</b>	

In Greece, the discontinuity between 2011 and 2012 is due to the introduction of reporting of counterfeit stamps used by Albanian nationals at the land border between Greece and Albania.

Spain data include detections on entry, exit and transit.

2012 Q1 data for Sweden only include fraudulent documents detected in March.

Due to reporting and comparability issues data from France have been excluded from this table in 2012.

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Annex Table 12. **Return decisions issued**

Decisions issued by top ten nationalities

	2012				2013	2013 Q2			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Albania	3 568	4 149	3 615	4 024	3 838	<b>4 588</b>	11	20	8.6
Pakistan	5 854	5 782	7 097	5 974	4 723	<b>4 034</b>	-30	-15	7.5
Morocco	4 214	4 022	3 744	3 456	3 439	<b>3 242</b>	-19	-5.7	6.1
India	3 088	2 467	2 360	2 713	2 901	<b>2 624</b>	6.4	-9.5	4.9
Algeria	3 696	3 955	3 269	2 851	2 480	<b>2 264</b>	-43	-8.7	4.2
Nigeria	2 455	2 251	2 327	2 312	2 320	<b>2 252</b>	0	-2.9	4.2
Afghanistan	6 421	7 198	6 321	3 207	2 253	<b>2 237</b>	-69	-0.7	4.2
Russian Federation	1 812	1 684	2 125	2 029	2 126	<b>2 141</b>	27	0.7	4.0
Ukraine	2 163	2 160	2 445	2 487	2 203	<b>2 072</b>	-4.1	-5.9	3.9
Tunisia	3 103	2 761	2 498	2 048	1 445	<b>1 885</b>	-32	30	3.5
Others	33 530	31 462	35 328	29 924	27 557	<b>26 247</b>	-17	-4.8	49
<b>Total</b>	<b>69 904</b>	<b>67 891</b>	<b>71 129</b>	<b>61 025</b>	<b>55 285</b>	<b>53 586</b>	<b>-21</b>	<b>-3.1</b>	<b>100</b>

Annex Table 13. **Effective returns**

People effectively returned to third countries by top ten nationalities

	2012				2013	2013 Q2			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Albania	3 028	3 071	2 903	4 166	3 478	<b>5 876</b>	91	69	15
Pakistan	2 366	2 490	1 831	3 826	3 179	<b>2 992</b>	20	-5.9	7.5
India	2 388	2 204	1 973	2 392	2 508	<b>2 133</b>	-3.2	-15	5.4
Morocco	2 078	2 020	1 889	1 769	1 729	<b>1 766</b>	-13	2.1	4.4
Ukraine	1 473	1 906	2 106	2 163	1 702	<b>1 749</b>	-8.2	2.8	4.4
Serbia	1 683	1 882	1 990	1 977	1 645	<b>1 742</b>	-7.4	5.9	4.4
Russian Federation	1 470	1 539	2 078	1 813	1 777	<b>1 705</b>	11	-4.1	4.3
Nigeria	1 094	1 259	1 158	1 160	1 293	<b>1 340</b>	6.4	3.6	3.4
Tunisia	1 621	1 841	1 782	1 263	1 130	<b>1 318</b>	-28	17	3.3
China	1 598	1 388	1 146	1 125	1 356	<b>1 267</b>	-8.7	-6.6	3.2
Others	19 845	20 843	19 414	20 518	18 434	<b>17 869</b>	-14	-3.1	45
<b>Total</b>	<b>38 644</b>	<b>40 443</b>	<b>38 270</b>	<b>42 172</b>	<b>38 231</b>	<b>39 757</b>	<b>-1.7</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>100</b>



Annex Table 14. **Effective returns by type of return**

People effectively returned to third countries by type of return and top ten nationalities

Type of Return	2012				2013		2013 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on		
							year ago	prev. qtr	
<b>Forced</b>	<b>19 625</b>	<b>21 273</b>	<b>18 892</b>	<b>22 840</b>	<b>19 534</b>	<b>22 176</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>56</b>
Enforced by Member State	17 077	18 423	14 976	20 305	15 263	<b>20 114</b>	9.2	32	91
Not specified	2 211	2 241	3 471	2 192	3 924	<b>1 747</b>	-22	-55	7.9
<b>Enforced by Joint Operation</b>	<b>337</b>	<b>609</b>	<b>445</b>	<b>343</b>	<b>347</b>	<b>315</b>	<b>-48</b>	<b>-9.2</b>	<b>1.4</b>
Voluntary	16 123	16 584	15 767	17 127	16 529	<b>15 256</b>	-8.0	-7.7	38
Others	8 586	9 589	8 476	9 782	9 431	<b>8 447</b>	-12	-10	55
IOM assisted	4 254	3 984	3 423	3 761	3 697	<b>4 020</b>	0.9	8.7	26
Not specified	3 283	3 011	3 868	3 584	3 401	2 789	-7.4	-18	18
<b>Not specified</b>	<b>2 896</b>	<b>2 586</b>	<b>3 611</b>	<b>2 205</b>	<b>2 168</b>	<b>2 325</b>	<b>-10</b>	<b>7.2</b>	<b>5.8</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>38 644</b>	<b>40 443</b>	<b>38 270</b>	<b>42 172</b>	<b>38 231</b>	<b>39 757</b>	<b>-1.7</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>TOP TEN NATIONALITIES</b>									
<b>Forced</b>									
Albania	2 871	2 864	2 579	3 649	3 246	<b>5 599</b>	95	72	25
Pakistan	1 574	1 759	997	2 873	2 298	<b>2 070</b>	18	-9.9	9.3
Tunisia	1 277	1 511	1 575	935	668	<b>877</b>	-42	31	4.0
Serbia	741	785	659	770	846	<b>856</b>	9.0	1.2	3.9
Morocco	870	847	830	817	747	<b>732</b>	-14	-2.0	3.3
India	843	872	899	824	731	<b>717</b>	-18	-1.9	3.2
Bangladesh	669	706	501	1 304	809	<b>709</b>	0.4	-12	3.2
Nigeria	586	774	707	660	641	<b>696</b>	-10	8.6	3.1
Egypt	389	499	438	337	378	<b>666</b>	33	76	3.0
Algeria	624	615	580	717	575	<b>656</b>	6.7	14	3.0
Others	9 181	10 041	9 127	9 954	8 595	<b>8 598</b>	-14	0	39
<b>Total Forced Returns</b>	<b>19 625</b>	<b>21 273</b>	<b>18 892</b>	<b>22 840</b>	<b>19 534</b>	<b>22 176</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Voluntary</b>									
Ukraine	1 124	1 483	1 707	1 765	1 377	<b>1 416</b>	-4.5	2.8	9.3
India	1 536	1 328	1 038	1 560	1 766	<b>1 410</b>	6.2	-20	9.2
Russian Federation	1 132	1 171	1 741	1 488	1 483	<b>1 338</b>	14	-9.8	8.8
Pakistan	770	708	680	918	861	<b>893</b>	26	3.7	5.9
Serbia	938	1 094	1 323	1 197	792	<b>879</b>	-20	11	5.8
China	903	759	563	477	846	<b>712</b>	-6.2	-16	4.7
Nigeria	429	433	336	444	609	<b>566</b>	31	-7.1	3.7
Kosovo*	400	392	393	408	308	<b>489</b>	25	59	3.2
Bangladesh	409	381	271	366	466	<b>473</b>	24	1.5	3.1
Tunisia	344	330	205	326	461	<b>440</b>	33	-4.6	2.9
Others	8 138	8 505	7 510	8 178	7 560	<b>6 640</b>	-22	-12	44
<b>Total Voluntary Returns</b>	<b>16 123</b>	<b>16 584</b>	<b>15 767</b>	<b>17 127</b>	<b>16 529</b>	<b>15 256</b>	<b>-8.0</b>	<b>-7.7</b>	<b>100</b>

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



### Sources and Methods

For the data concerning detections at the external borders, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data on all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. For Cyprus, the land border refers to the Green Line demarcation with the area not under the effective control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked Member States including Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain and in Greece, these detections are included in the data for Indicator 1A. Data for Norway only includes detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

In Italy, detections of illegal border-crossing at sea BCPs are only reported for intra-EU border-crossing from Greece. Data on detections of illegal border-crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators is not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border type, but are reported as total apprehensions (not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include land intra-EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections at exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the UK. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on applications for international protection (FRAN Indicator 5) are not disaggregated by place of application (type of border on entry or inland applications) for Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For these countries, only the total number of applications is reported. For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For Switzerland, requests for asylum at the Swiss Embassies abroad are also reported and considered as inland applications in the FRAN data. For the UK, data reported for applications at air BCPs also include applications at sea BCPs





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